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Abstract
This Article demonstrates that modern authoritative jurists working within the Shi’i tradition
have developed their rules respecting sex regulation in order to serve three primary commitments.
The first commitment is less a normative expectation and more a presumption of reality. It is that
there is an intense and near debilitating desire on the part of human beings generally, though mostly
men, for a great deal of sex. This desire must be satisfied, but it also must be tightly controlled.
This is because of the second commitment, which is that excessive licentiousness is a form of
secular distraction from a believer’s central obligation to worship God. The final, and perhaps
most interesting, commitment concerns maintaining and upholding gender differentiation in order
to ensure the preservation of traditional gender roles within an established gendered hierarchy.
That is, there must be clear delineations between men, on the one hand, and women, on the other,
if hierarchies relating to the proper roles of men and women are to be maintained. This explains
the rather curious discrepancy within Shi’i Islam, discussed toward the end of this Article, wherein
change of gender is tolerated, to some extent, and homosexuality is not, to any extent.
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INTRODUCTION 
Sex is regulated everywhere, all of the time. This is so obvious 
as to be uninteresting. What is interesting is precisely how it is 
regulated in different normative orders; what that reveals about the 
underlying values, biases, and presuppositions of those respective 
normative orders; and whether and to what extent such normative 
orders, and their rules on sex and sexuality, affect State law and social 
practice in any given society. The purpose of this Article is to address 
the first two of these questions in the context of modern Shi’i Islam. 
The third question, touched upon in the conclusion, will be the focus 
of a separate, subsequent paper.1 
This Article demonstrates that modern authoritative jurists 
working within the Shi’i tradition have developed their rules 
respecting sex regulation in order to serve three primary 
commitments. The first commitment is less a normative expectation 
and more a presumption of reality. It is that there is an intense and 
near debilitating desire on the part of human beings generally, though 
mostly men, for a great deal of sex.2 This desire must be satisfied, but 
it also must be tightly controlled. This is because of the second 
commitment, which is that excessive licentiousness is a form of 
secular distraction from a believer’s central obligation to worship 
God.3 The final, and perhaps most interesting, commitment concerns 
maintaining and upholding gender differentiation in order to ensure 
the preservation of traditional gender roles within an established 
gendered hierarchy.4 That is, there must be clear delineations between 
men, on the one hand, and women, on the other, if hierarchies relating 
to the proper roles of men and women are to be maintained. This 
explains the rather curious discrepancy within Shi’i Islam, discussed 
                                                            
1. If it is true, as it is often said, that the law is best studied through a thorough 
understanding of what it does, excising references to law and social practice in modern states 
may seem peculiar. That said, Shi’ism is dramatically understudied as a general matter, and as 
a religio-normative system, it has developed elaborate rules in the area of sex regulation that 
deserve greater attention than they have received. In light of this, there is no competent way in 
a single law review article both to outline that system and then to describe its effect in practice 
among the Shi’i populations across the globe. Even to attempt to do so would do injustice to 
one of the two themes. Accordingly, the system is described independently of praxis here, in 
the hope that in the near future I will be in a position to commit time and space to the 
important praxiological questions raised. 
2.  This is discussed in detail in Part I of this Article. 
3.  This is discussed in Part II of this Article. 
4.  This is discussed in Part III of this Article. 
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toward the end of this Article, wherein change of gender is tolerated, 
to some extent, and homosexuality is not, to any extent. 
Part I begins with a definition of precisely what the sexual 
convention is in Shi’i Islam; namely, sex of virtually any conceivable 
variety as between a man and one of his wives, permanent or 
temporary.5 This serves to demonstrate the first demand of which 
Shi’ism takes heed in its regulation of sex and sexuality; namely, that 
there is an intense human need for sex, mostly on the part of men, and 
that it requires broad recognition in any realistic social order.6 The 
Part also shows the manner in which these sexual relationships are 
highly gendered, with the husband having the primary obligation to 
                                                            
5.  In fact, there is one other permissible sexual relationship discussed by the jurists, and 
this is sex between a master and his female slaves. Modern jurists writing compendia well into 
the twentieth century have spent considerable time on the rules respecting this particular form 
of permissibility and its limitations. See, e.g., 2 ABDUL MAJID AL-KHU’I, MINHAJ AL-
SALIHEEN ¶¶ 1320-1340 (1992) [hereinafter KHU’I] (setting forth detailed rules on when sex 
with female slaves is permissible, and the consequences of such sex, including prohibitions 
against selling the female slave who has given birth to the master’s child, and the setting of the 
status of the child as free); see also 14 MUHSEN IBN MAHDI TABATABA’I AL-HAKIM, 
MUSTAMSIK AL-URWA AL-WUTHQA 179–96 (1983) [hereinafter URWA] (setting forth rules, 
inter alia, respecting circumstances where sex between a female slave and a master’s father or 
son might be permissible, and the consequences when it is not). However, these juristic 
discussions appear to be waning. Grand Ayatollah Sistani, the current primus inter pares of the 
juristic authorities in Najaf, does not discuss rules respecting sex with slaves at all beyond a 
footnote, indicating that it is not necessary to do so given the absence of slavery in 
contemporary society. See 2 ALI AL-SISTANI, MINHAJ AL-SALIHEEN 11 n.1 (2008) [hereinafter 
SISTANI]. This practice has been adopted by other high jurists operating in Najaf as well, 
among them Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Saeed al-Hakim. See 3 MUHAMMAD SAEED AL-
HAKIM, MINHAJ AL-SALIHEEN 18 (2002) [hereinafter SAEED AL-HAKIM] (indicating that he 
will not address the rules respecting sex with female slaves because it is not relevant in our 
times). Moreover, even when the rules concerning sex with female slaves were the subject of 
significant discussion by earlier jurists of the twentieth century, the matter was more 
theoretical than it was legal. Slavery has been illegal in Iran since 1928, and in Iraq since 1924. 
See Behnaz A. Mirzai, Emancipation and Its Legacy in Iran: An Overview, UNESCO, 4 
(2008), http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/CLT/dialogue/pdf/Emanci
pation%20Legacy%20Iran.pdf (noting abolition of slavery in Iran in 1928); Cindy J. Smith & 
Kristiina Kangaspunta, Defining Human Trafficking and Its Nuances in a Cultural Context, in 
HUMAN TRAFFICKING: EXPLORING THE INTERNATIONAL NATURE, CONCERNS, AND 
COMPLEXITIES 19, 21 (John Winterdyk, Benjamin Perrin & Philip Reichel eds., 2012) 
(discussing the abolition of slavery in Iraq and Iran). Neither the Islamic Revolution in Iran nor 
the victory of Shi’i Islamist parties in Iraqi elections has resulted in any change to this. The 
fact that contemporary jurists have reacted to the banning of slavery by omitting their own 
rules of sex and slavery, rather than continuing to recite them, let alone exhorting their 
recognition into law, strongly suggests that they have acceded to this fundamental social 
change and no longer resist it. Accordingly, given the irrelevance of the rules of sex with 
female slaves, I do not discuss the subject herein except at the margins.  
6.  See, e.g., infra note 112 and accompanying quotation (taking the position that 
marriage to multiple women is recommended without limitation). 
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support his wife in most cases,7 and pay her a sum known as the mahr 
in all cases,8 and the wife having the primary obligation to enable the 
man to enjoy her sexually at virtually any time of his choosing.9 
Part II then discusses the manner in which particular sexual 
practices are recommended and others are disfavored10 so as to limit 
and control the same natural impulses, out of a desire to ensure the 
central place of God, and not sex, in the heart and mind of the 
believer.11 Thus, for example, the preference in favor of the wearing 
of clothes during intercourse is meant to help limit excessive focus on 
sexual desire.12 Similarly, rules concerning times and places of 
appropriate sex, and acts of worship in connection therewith,13 help to 
reestablish the central role of the Divine in all aspects of life, 
including the performance of sex.  
Part III deals with those sexual acts that are criminally 
prohibited, and for which severe punishment is mandated. Such 
prohibitions mainly concern any form of sex that takes place outside 
of the contract of marriage, where the role of the husband and the 
wife are strictly defined and controlled in the manner described in the 
first two Parts. The most well known of these is the prohibition on 
fornication, which is defined as vaginal sex between a man and a 
woman who are not married to one another.14  
                                                            
7.  SISTANI, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 103-104; KHU’I, supra note 5, at 287. The obligation to 
support does not exist in a temporary marriage. KHU’I, supra note 5, at 2 ¶ 1318. 
8.  KHU’I, supra note 5, at 2 ¶¶ 1350-1354 (permanent marriage); SISTANI, supra note 5, 
at 3 ¶ 233 (temporary marriage). The Arabic term mahr is not easy to translate into English. 
The term “dowry” or “dower” is inexact because it usually refers to the obligation of a bride’s 
family to pay money to the groom, rather than the reverse. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW 
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 681, 683 (Grove ed. 2002). The term “bride price” is similarly 
inexact, as that is a sum paid by a groom to a bride’s parents, rather than the bride herself. Id. 
at 276. Given this, I have continued to use the original Arabic term rather than an inaccurate 
and potentially misleading translation. 
9.  See infra note 48 and accompanying text (describing wife’s obligation of 
“enablement”). 
10.  Islamic law traditionally divides acts into five categories—the obligatory, the 
recommended, the permitted (with neither favor nor disfavor), the disfavored, and the sinful. 
Mohammad Fadel, Islamic Law and American Law: Between Concordance and Dissonance, 
57 N.Y.L.S. L. REV. 231, 233 (2013). Part II will focus on those matters that are either 
recommended or disfavored that are undertaken in connection with sex. 
11.  See infra notes 124-43 and accompanying text. 
12.  See infra notes 138-41 and accompanying text (quoting rules preferring that sex be 
undertaken while the parties remain clothed). 
13.  See infra note 142 and accompanying quotation. 
14.  KHU’I, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 134.  
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Interestingly, even more categorically denounced than 
fornication within Shi’ism, to the contradistinction of the schools of 
Sunni Islam, is homosexuality on the part of either men or women.15 
The reason relates to the third of the demands that Shi’i Islam seeks to 
realize—the preservation of gender differentiation for the purposes of 
ensuring the continuation of traditional gender roles and hierarchies.16 
Having determined that the desire for sex must be recognized and 
strictly limited, and having decided to recognize and limit it 
exclusively through the relationship of husband and wife, with each 
of them having quite different roles in the relationship, the only way 
to preserve the continuation of gender hierarchies in the permitted 
sexual relationships would be to prohibit same-sex relationships 
altogether.17 After all, recognizing such relationships would require 
the creation of gender-neutral rules for their sexual unions, which 
would upset the entire system of gender hierarchy already established 
in the male-female marriage contract. Hence, homosexuality is 
denounced and punished in the strongest possible terms.18 
Part IV contrasts two commitments that play more significant 
roles in the regulation of sex in other normative orders and shows that 
                                                            
15.  While lesbian sex is an unambiguous sin within the classical traditions of Sunni 
Islam, it is not a scriptural crime that necessitates temporal punishment across its four primary 
schools. Thus, to the extent that lesbian sex was criminalized within Sunni Islam, it was as a 
sexual transgression that merited discretionary punishment delivered by state authorities, 
rather than a scriptural one that required punishment as an offense against God. See JUDITH E. 
TUCKER, WOMEN, FAMILY AND GENDER IN ISLAMIC LAW 190 (2008). As for male-to-male 
homosexuality, most jurists either proscribed it as part of the scriptural crime of fornication, or 
as a separate scriptural crime. In either case, it was strictly limited to actual anal intercourse. 
See Hassan El Menyawi, Same-Sex Marriage in Islamic Law, 2 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 
375, 398 (2012) (“The act of . . . sodomy[] is the only criminal act that is enunciated by the 
four early jurists . . . . Contrary to the statements of some members of the religious 
intelligentsia in the modern period, there is no criminalization or penalty for homosexuality per 
se. In fact, the term homosexuality is not itself contemplated or examined by the four early . . . 
jurists. [Sodomy] is solely restricted to the act of anal intercourse in which the penis of one 
man (known as the ‘active’) consensually or non-consensually penetrates the anus of another 
man (known as the ‘passive’).”). Moreover, a significant faction of the jurists within the Sunni 
Hanafi school did not deem anal intercourse between men to be a scriptural crime at all, but 
rather a discretionary one, as with lesbianism. It was, in other words, a sin that temporal 
authorities could punish, but were not obligated to. See CHRISTIAN LANGE, JUSTICE, 
PUNISHMENT AND THE MEDIEVAL MUSLIM IMAGINATION 199-214 (2008). 
16.  This observation is by no means unique to Shi’i Islam. Very similar arguments have 
been made respecting Sunni Islam. See, e.g., 1 SAMAR HABIB, ISLAM AND HOMOSEXUALITY 
213-14 (2010); KECIA ALI, SEXUAL ETHICS AND ISLAM: FEMINIST REFLECTIONS ON QUR’AN, 
HADITH, AND JURISPRUDENCE 95-96 (2006).  
17.  See infra notes 185-89 and accompanying text. 
18.  See infra Part III.B.1. 
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they are in fact secondary in Shi’i Islam. The first of these relates to 
the procreative potential of sex. While this is central to sex regulation 
in many traditional normative orders, and while there are Shi’i rules 
that take it into account, procreation is largely viewed as an ancillary 
consequence of sex rather than a cause of its regulation.19 This is 
important because of its implications on an individual’s choice to 
undergo a simultaneous gender and sex change. Obviously, there is no 
procreative potential in a sexual relationship involving a person who 
has changed their sex and gender. Procreation, however, is not what 
the regulation of sex is fundamentally about in Shi’i Islam, and so this 
creates no real obstacle to the legal recognition of such a change. 
Moreover, unlike homosexuality, the changing of gender and sex does 
not challenge traditional gender differentiations and hierarchies. It 
does not force any change in the regulation of sexual relationships at 
all. It merely changes the rules pursuant to which the person 
undergoing the change must play. Therefore, some Shi’i jurists 
tolerate transgenderism to a large extent, with one important 
condition; it must be accompanied by a full anatomical sex change.20 
Any result that produced any sort of ambiguity respecting the 
resulting gender or sex of a person is not tolerated, nor could it easily 
be sustained within the gender hierarchy envisaged in the Shi’i 
system. 21  
The other secondary value addressed in Part IV lies at the other 
end of the spectrum—one that plays a large role in the regulation of 
sex in liberal societies—the protection of children from sexual harm. 
As with procreation, this value is recognized within Shi’i Islam, but it 
is secondary and focused nearly exclusively on physical harm, rather 
                                                            
19.  See infra notes 244-48 and accompanying text. 
20.  See infra notes 283-84 and accompanying text (pointing out that until an actual 
surgical operation takes place, a man has the duties of a man imposed upon him, and a woman 
has the duties of a woman imposed upon her, which include a strict prohibition against same 
sex relations). 
21.  This is a point that Ali makes in the context of Sunni juristic texts, in the following 
manner: 
[T]he acknowledgment of the existence of transsexuals is not more of a 
challenge to the standard jurisprudential discourse of sex/gender than that of 
the hermaphrodite in classical and medieval discourses, nor is a person of 
ambiguous sex a challenge to the binary system once properly categorized. 
ALI, supra note 16, at 94. Ali goes on to make the point that popular opposition only 
arises if the transgendered person is not viewed as “really” belonging to the sex to which they 
have changed, but only is doing so in order to have sex with persons of their original, actual 
sex. See id. As is discussed in Part IV.A, this appears to be Sistani’s concern in the Shi’i 
tradition. 
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than any harm arising from the violation of bodily autonomy. A 
husband who has vaginal or anal sex with his minor wife has sinned, 
precisely because of the physical harm that could befall the girl.22 
However, if the rule is violated and the girl suffers physical injury 
from the intercourse, the consequences, while significant, are 
designed exclusively to compensate for the physical harm, in strong 
contrast to the rules in a liberal society, where the violation of the 
child’s autonomy would alone be viewed as meriting not only 
compensation for harm, but also significant criminal punishment.23 
Before continuing, it is important to note two important caveats. 
First, this Article concerns the regulation of sex among the 
authoritative jurists of Shi’ism in the modern era, beginning in the 
middle of the nineteenth century at the twilight of the Ottoman 
Empire,24 and continuing through to this day. It takes no position on 
the evolution of Shi’i thought prior to this period. It emphatically does 
not engage with any alternative, progressive views that have been 
raised with increasing frequency during this time within the Shi’i 
community.25 Such approaches are important and worthy of 
consideration, but are not the subject of this paper. Accordingly, it is 
absolutely not my purpose to suggest, by any means, that faith in Shi’i 
Islam necessitates the belief in the regulation of sex in the manner 
                                                            
22.  See infra notes 318-19 and accompanying text. 
23.  See infra notes 320-34 and accompanying text. 
24.  The Ottoman Empire’s birth is commonly attributed to the date it conquered 
Constantinople and renamed it Istanbul, in 1453. ALBERT HOURANI, A HISTORY OF THE ARAB 
PEOPLES 214-15 (1991). It came to an end with the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. 
Id. at 316. 
25.  There are significant voices in favor of changing the received traditions and 
methods of the existing juristic seminaries. See, e.g., ABDULAZIZ SACHEDINA, ISLAM AND THE 
CHALLENGE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 115-46 (2009) (offering an Islamic position respecting 
women’s rights that is far more consonant with modern progressive values than the traditional 
rulings herein described). See generally Hamid Mavani, Two Shi’i Jurisprudential 
Methodologies to Address Medical and Bioethical Challenges: Traditional Ijtihād and 
Foundational Ijtihād, 2 J. RELIGIOUS ETHICS 263 (2014) (laying out an alternative vision of 
“foundational ijtihad,” advocated by Mohsen Kadivar, that would enable a broad reappraisal of 
past determinations, including those pertaining to women). It suffices to say that these 
approaches are met with fierce resistance from leading forces within the traditionalist camp 
that continue to hold sway with the devout masses. In 1998, Grand Ayatollah Sistani went so 
far as to order believers not to invite Sachedina to lecture at religious gatherings, nor to seek 
answers from him on religious questions. Akil M. Karim, Implications of A. Seestani’s Rulings 
on Dr. Sachedina (Follow-up) ‘AALIM NETWORK (Oct. 21, 1998, 9:50 PM), http://www.al-
islam.org/organizations/AalimNetwork/msg00807.html; see also Abdulaziz Sachedina, What 
Happened in Najaf, http://islam.uga.edu/sachedina_silencing.html (last visited Oct. 15, 15) 
(describing encounter between Sistani and Sachedina, where Sistani offered to pay Sachedina 
his salary if he would cease propagating his allegedly false beliefs respecting Islam).   
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hereinafter contemplated. There may indeed be other ways to interpret 
Shi’i Islam’s sacred texts. For reasons of space alone, this paper 
exclusively explores what might be termed Shi’i orthodoxy, leaving 
the consideration of heterodox approaches to different times and 
different places. 
Secondly, this Article is unrelentingly realist in its orientation. 
Obviously, in developing rules, jurists do not claim to be realizing 
any moral and ideological commitments of the sort described above. 
Rather, they justify their positions as being the interpretation of 
primary authoritative texts, precisely as any US judge would do, with 
the only difference between them being the authoritative texts to 
which they turn. Those who actually believe that Islamic jurists (or 
US judges) actually do this, or indeed that they can possibly do it, in a 
neutral and antiseptic fashion, will no doubt find the approach this 
Article takes as excessively cynical and unduly dismissive of the 
interpretive task. Those more willing to contemplate the possibility 
that something other than apolitical and unbiased interpretation is 
taking place in juristic academies and judicial chambers alike—those, 
that is, who take to heart Llewellyn’s famous adage that what the 
judge says is less important than what the judge does26—might find 
the approach more satisfying. In any event, I make no pretense of my 
own deep-seated belief that texts, and in particular religious texts over 
a millennium old, are ambiguous, contradictory, and capable of 
manifold interpretations. What the community of jurists ultimately 
decides is the correct approach is driven, by necessity, by the 
ideological commitments of that community. The purpose of this 
Article is to do no less and no more than reveal those commitments as 
they pertain to the regulation of sex. 
I. DEFINING PERMISSIBLE SEX 
A. Marriage as Contract for Licit Sex 
The identification of marriage to sex is so close within Shi’ism 
that the terminology tends to overlap, and in a manner that causes 
some degree of confusion. Hence, Shi’i jurists most often refer to 
sexual intercourse through the transitive verbs wata’a or jama’a, or 
                                                            
26.  KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: THE CLASSIC LECTURES ON THE LAW 
AND LAW SCHOOL 7 (2008). 
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the nouns derived therefrom, wata’ and jima’.27 When dealing with 
specifically contractual elements of the marriage, variants of the root 
verb zawaja are frequently used.28 Finally, there is the more generic 
and broadly used juristic term nikah. Shi’i jurists invariably title the 
section of their juristic compendia that address the questions of 
marriage as Kitab al-Nikah, which would conventionally be translated 
as the “Book of Marriage.”29 
Yet nikah does not mean “marriage” in the same sense that 
zawaj does. For example, in defining the three types of nikah, the 
primus inter pares of the Najaf juristic academies until his death in 
1992, Grand Ayatollah Khu’i, refers to them as “permanent, 
temporary and the ownership of the right hand.”30 The third of these 
refers to the historic dispensation of male owners to the sexual 
enjoyment of their unmarried female slaves.31 While such 
concubinage is beyond the scope of this paper, it should be obvious 
that sexual permissibility of this sort does not arise out of any sort of 
marriage contract authorizing it.  
A better translation of nikah might therefore be “permissible 
sex,” as it encompasses not only the contractually arranged sex of 
zawaj, but also the licit sex that transpires between a master and his 
female slaves. Yet the term also can mean the act of sexual 
intercourse itself. To demonstrate the confusion, I provide below the 
opening passage of the Book of the Nikah from the juristic 
compendium that has proven to be the most markedly influential in 
modern times.32 It is referred to as the Jawāhir al-Kalam (henceforth, 
Jawahir), written in the middle of the nineteenth century by 
                                                            
27.  See, e.g., Sistani, supra note 5, at 2 ¶ 8 (noting that it is not permitted to have 
intercourse with (wata’a) a wife before she reaches the age of nine lunar years); id. at ¶ 5 
(explaining that intercourse (jima’) is disfavored on the night of a lunar eclipse). 
28.  See, e.g., id. at ¶ 26 (“If the guardian marries (zawaja) his ward to one who has a 
deficiency, then the contract is corrupt with respect to [the ward] . . . .”). 
29.  Tucker, for example, seems to translate the nikah as “contract of marriage.” 
TUCKER, supra note 15, at 41.   
30.  Khu’i, supra note 5, at 258. 
31.  See id. at 2 ¶¶ 1320-1340. 
32.  See ABDULAZIZ SACHEDINA, THE JUST RULER IN SHI’ITE ISLAM: THE 
COMPREHENSIVE AUTHORITY OF THE JURIST IN IMAMITE JURISPRUDENCE 22 (1988) 
(describing the influence of the Jawāhir). For a less sober and academic account, one popular 
website describes the Jawāhir as “an indispensable companion of every [jurist] worth any 
name, since each line in it requires profound pondering and elucidation.” See Allamah Shaikh 
Muhammad Hasan Najafi ‘Sahib-e-Jawāhir,’ Imam Reza (A.S.) Network, http://www.imam
reza.net/eng/imamreza.php?id=6934. 
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Muhammad Hasan al-Najafi, a leading and highly respected scholar 
of the modern era:33  
[Nikah] is linguistically sexual intercourse, by a significant 
majority [of jurists] and indeed according to various [sources], by 
consensus. This is the agreement of the linguists. [One source] 
says, “Nikah is sexual intercourse, but it can be used for the 
contract.” [Another source says], “the foundation of nikah is 
sexual intercourse, and then marriage is called permissible nikah, 
because it is the basis for the sexual intercourse.” This is not 
contradicted by [another source], which says, “it is sexual 
intercourse and the contract.” Thus, there is much that overlaps 
between the reality, the permissible, language, and the shari’a.34 
The Jawahir later explains that jurists generally regard nikah as 
meaning intercourse linguistically, while it refers to the contract for 
intercourse for purposes of the rules comprising the shari’a.35 To 
avoid mistranslation, I shall use the word nikah in untranslated form 
throughout while translating forms of the verb zawaj to refer to the 
actual contract of marriage. 
B. The Permanent Marriage 
If the centrality of sex to marriage were not clear enough from 
the liberal use of a word, nikah, which seems to mean simultaneously 
sex, permissible sex, and marriage, it is rendered even clearer by 
virtue of the rules respecting the two forms of marriage recognized in 
Shi’i Islam.36 This Section focuses on the first of these—the 
permanent marriage. The next Section addresses the temporary 
marriage. 
Upon entering a permanent marriage, a husband must agree to 
pay his contracted wife a sum known as a mahr, agreed upon by the 
two of them, part or all of which may be delayed in payment to a 
future date.37 If no future date is set, then it is due upon conclusion of 
the contract.38 That this is a form of compensation for sex is made 
obvious enough by the fact that the wife is entitled to refuse sexual 
                                                            
33.  SACHEDINA, supra note 25, at 22. 
34.  29 MUHAMMAD HASAN AL-NAJAFI, JAWAHIR AL-KALAM FI SHARH SHARA’I AL-
ISLAM 5 (Abbas al-Quchani ed., 7th ed. 1981) (ca. 1841) [hereinafter Jawahir]. 
35.  See id. at 29:6. 
36.  See KHU’I, supra note 5, at 258 (describing two forms of marriage). 
37.  See id. at 2 ¶¶ 1350-1354. 
38.  See id. at 2 ¶ 1353. 
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intercourse until she is paid this agreed amount.39 The Jawahir 
explains precisely why this is in clear enough terms:  
She may refuse sex and the surrendering of her body until she 
receives her mahr by agreement, and the same is true for lifting 
her veil and other matters. This is because the nikah with the 
mahr is compensation for [those actions]. She is not alone using 
these appropriate means. Every party to be compensated may 
refuse to surrender until they receive the compensation. Based on 
the report of Zur’a bin Sama’a, “I asked him about a man who 
married a maiden and enjoyed her then she rendered him free of 
his mahr. May he have intercourse with her before he gives her 
anything? He said, ‘Yes. If she rendered him free, then she has 
taken the mahr from him.’” But for embarrassment, difficulty, 
harm, or oppression, she should not deny him, because the vulva 
is compensation by consensus, and the nikah is compensation 
first. Based on plentiful texts [i.e. original source material], what 
the husband gives her enables him to have sex with her, and 
makes her vagina permissible to him.40 
As the above makes clear, a wife may dispense with the mahr 
promised to her, and she may also agree to a negligible amount, or 
even to a mahr comprising nothing more than a simple service of no 
market value at all.41 As with any contract, nobody is going to force 
the seller to demand a high price.  
If, however, the parties for some reason fail to affix a price for a 
permanent marriage, then, as with a contract for sale under the 
Uniform Commercial Code, the law will fix a reasonable one for 
them.42 The jurists refer to this as the “mahr of equivalence.”43 Taken 
into account are characteristics such as “age, virginity, nobility, 
                                                            
39.  While not every jurist explains the reason for this rule in the manner that the 
Jawahir does in the passage quoted in the main text, there is absolute unanimity respecting the 
rule itself. Jurists repeatedly make the point that a woman may refuse sexual intercourse until 
she receives whatever mahr is due to her immediately. See, e.g., id. at 2 ¶ 1362; SISTANI, 
supra note 5, at 2 ¶ 306; SAEED AL-HAKIM, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 157. 
40.  Jawahir, supra note 34, at 31:41. 
41.  SISTANI, supra note 5, at 2 ¶ 286 (indicating that the mahr may be anything that is 
possible for a Muslim to own, including a promised service, such as teaching the wife a 
chapter of the Qur’an). 
42.  U.C.C. § 2-305(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002) (“The parties if 
they so intend can conclude a contract for sale even though the price is not settled. In such a 
case the price is a reasonable price at the time for delivery if . . . nothing is said as to price . . . 
.”).  
43.  SISTANI, supra note 5, at 3 ¶¶ 294–295; KHU’I, supra note 5, at ¶ 1354.  
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modesty, intelligence, morals, honor, maturity and their opposites.”44 
All other things being equal, a young virgin commands a higher price 
than an elderly woman who has been married twice before. To make 
the commodification of specifically the intact hymen clear, jurists 
indicate, again without noticeable dispute among them, that one who 
rapes a virgin owes her a mahr of equivalence.45 This is, after all, the 
closest approximation to the mahr she would have been able to 
receive in a contract for her marriage. 
A husband’s other primary obligation in a permanent marriage is 
to financially support his wife, and in the manner to which she would 
have been accustomed in her father’s home, which would include 
food, clothing, medicine, shelter, servants, and the like.46 This 
obligation, and what it entails, is described in painstaking detail in the 
Jawahir.47 
In exchange for these forms of financial compensation, a woman 
has one core obligation, to which all others are ancillary. It is 
described with great frequency by modern Shi’i jurists in a single 
Arabic term—tamkin, or “enablement.”48 Specifically, she must 
enable her husband to enjoy intercourse with her at any time of his 
choosing, with only the most limited of exceptions, relating primarily 
to illness49 and the performance of obligatory acts of worship.50 An 
ancillary obligation of the wife involves not leaving the home without 
the husband’s permission, again with a primary exception being the 
performance of obligatory acts of worship such as the pilgrimage to 
Mecca.51 A primary reason seems to be that it would curtail a 
                                                            
44.  SISTANI, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 295. 
45.  See id. at 3 ¶ 319; SAEED AL-HAKIM, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 161; KHU’I, supra note 5, 
at 2 ¶ 1351. 
46.  SISTANI, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 103-104; KHU’I, supra note 5, at 287; Jawahir, supra 
note 34, at 31:330. 
47.  Jawahir, supra note 34, at 31:330-54. 
48.  See, e.g., id. at 31:303 (indicating that a condition for the husband’s obligation to 
support is “entire enablement, which is to cede to him entirely . . . setting neither time nor 
place where his enjoyment of her is permissible”); KHU’I, supra note 5, at 2 ¶ 1365 (“A wife is 
obligated to enable and to remove any repugnancy.”); SISTANI, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 337 
(“[T]he right of a husband against his wife is that she enable him to near her, and otherwise 
[enable him] for the enjoyments established for him as the [marriage] contract requires, at any 
time he wishes, and that she does not prevent him except for a legitimate reason . . . .”). 
49.  Jawahir, supra note 34, at 31:312. 
50.  Id. at 31:314–315.  
51.  See SAEED AL-HAKIM, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 188; see also SISTANI, supra note 5, at 3 
¶¶ 337(1), 338 (noting, in addition to an ability to leave the house to perform an act obligatory 
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husband’s right of enjoyment if she did leave without his 
permission.52 
The Jawahir states that recommended acts of worship do not 
give a wife a right to refuse enablement. In other words, according to 
the Jawahir, a woman who wishes to say an additional prayer during 
a day or to fast for three days as an act of worship is not permitted to 
do so without her husband’s permission, because it would limit his 
right to sexual enjoyment.53 If he were to give her permission to fast, 
and then change his mind because he desired sex, she must break her 
fast so as to enable him.54 
A husband’s obligation to support his wife comes to an end if 
she does not enable him, though there is some dispute over how much 
she must refuse to enable before a husband is justified in cutting off 
support. Sistani indicates that if a wife only partially fails to enable 
her husband, then the husband may not cut off support, because of 
what in Shi’i parlance is referred to as “obligatory precaution.”55 
Basically, this means that the possibility that the husband in fact owes 
the wife support despite her refusal to submit sexually on occasion is 
uncertain enough that out of precaution, it remains his obligation to 
pay support rather than risk falling into sin for failing to do so. Sistani 
acknowledges, however, that the more “widespread” opinion is that a 
woman who is failing to enable her husband, even on occasion, may 
have support cut off from her.56 This certainly is the position of the 
Jawahir, which indicates that a condition of support is “complete 
                                                                                                                                     
on her, additional exceptions to visit relatives, offer support when they are sick, or attend their 
funerals). 
52.  See SISTANI, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 337(1) (“The right of a husband against his wife 
is . . . that [the wife] not leave her home without his permission if this would deny his right to 
enjoyment; in fact, at all is the more manifest opinion.”). As this quotation reveals, Sistani 
believes the “more manifest” opinion is that a wife is obligated never to leave the marital home 
without her husband’s permission even if it does not curtail his right of sexual enjoyment. That 
type of expression of uncertainty (i.e. describing a position as a “more manifest” one than an 
unambiguously correct one) is common among Shi’i jurists, though it is notable that Sistani 
shows no similar doubt about a wife’s obligation not to leave the marital home if it does curtail 
a husband’s right to sexual satisfaction. See id. That said, the idea of imprisoning a wife in a 
home may extend for reasons beyond a wife’s obligation of enablement and include the 
broader notion of secluding women from the potential gaze of others. Hence, for example, 
Grand Ayatollah Muhsen Hakim indicates that it is “recommended” for a husband to imprison 
his wife in the home and not let any man enter upon her. URWA, supra note 5, at 14:11.   
53.  See Jawahir, supra note 34, at 31:314-15. 
54.  See id.  
55.  See SISTANI, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 351. 
56.  See id. 
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enablement,” wherein the husband is free to satisfy his sexual needs 
without restriction as to time or place.57  
What is not disputed are the other actions that a husband may 
take against his wife if she fails to enable him. First, he may 
admonish her for her failings.58 If this does not work, then he may 
turn his back on her in bed or avoid her bedside altogether in favor of 
other wives if he is polygamous.59 If this does not work, he may use 
physical discipline and hit her to the minimum extent necessary to 
ensure her compliance with her obligation to enable him sexually.60 
The beatings may get stronger and stronger as she continues to refuse 
to comply,61 but they may not reach the level of the breaking of bones 
or the bruising of flesh.62 
Finally, a man is entitled to take no more than four permanent 
wives at any single time.63 This restriction is mitigated by the fact that 
a man has an absolute power to terminate a marriage through a single 
oral pronouncement of what is known in Arabic as talaq.64 That said, 
Shi’i rules attempt to limit divorce—through the medium of sex. 
Specifically, a husband is obligated to support his wife for three 
menstrual cycles following the pronouncement of talaq, and she is 
obligated to remain in the marital home.65 She is permitted, and 
indeed it is recommended to her, to show him her “beauty” when in 
the marital home.66 Were he to have sex with her again during this 
                                                            
57.  See Jawahir, supra note 34, at 31:303. 
58.  SISTANI, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 353; KHU’I, supra note 5, at 2 ¶ 1365. 
59.  SISTANI, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 353. Normally, a wife of a husband with other wives 
has a certain right to have her husband spend a certain number of nights with her to the extent 
he spends time with his other wives. KHU’I, supra note 5, at 2 ¶ 1363. That right is suspended 
for a wife who refuses to enable her husband. 
60.  SISTANI, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 353. 
61.  See id. 
62.  See SAEED AL-HAKIM, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 190; KHU’I, supra note 5, at 2 ¶ 1365. 
63.  See URWA, supra note 5, at 14:93. 
64.  To be clear, there are formal rules for precisely how the talaq must be pronounced 
to protect against hasty or ill-conceived attempts to divorce. For example, the husband must 
use the term talaq specifically, so that “go back to your parents” is not, in fact, deemed an end 
to a marriage, no matter what the broader context. See SISTANI, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 498. Two 
male Muslim witnesses must be present at the pronouncement. See id. at 3 ¶ 498. The husband 
must be of sound mind, which includes a requirement of sobriety. See id. at 3 ¶ 475. A wife 
cannot be menstruating or bleeding during childbirth at the time that the talaq is pronounced. 
See id. at 3 ¶ 485. While these rules can create temporary, procedural impediments to a quick 
divorce, they are no permanent obstacle to any husband sincerely wishing to be free of his 
marriage obligation to his wife. 
65.  KHU’I, supra note 5, at 2 ¶ 1474. 
66.  See id. 
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three-month period, which is plainly facilitated by these rules, they 
resume their marriage automatically.67 A woman has no right to a 
similar type of divorce unless her husband has made her his agent for 
pronouncing it as part of the marriage contract.68 She can, however, 
seek a judicially ordered dissolution of the marriage, if she has a 
religiously recognized cause to do so.69 
It is perfectly obvious that these rules presume a great deal of 
sexual desire on the part of men that demands satisfaction. Women 
seem to be, in many ways, merely the vehicle through which this 
desire is satiated, rather than having such desire on their own. Even 
the means to describe the wife’s obligation—enablement—is quite 
telling. The Arabic verbs used by the jurists to describe the sexual act 
as between husband and wife are transitive, and the woman serves 
always as object, never as subject.70 Thus, a wife, in the discourse of 
the jurists, cannot have sex with her husband, but can only enable him 
to have sex with her.  
That said, a woman’s sexual desire is contemplated by the 
juristic rules, albeit in a far diminished form to that of a man. For 
example, a man has an obligation to have sex with his wife once 
every four months at least, and not to extend travel beyond that 
time.71 He is religiously obligated to have sex with her more often 
than that if she cannot wait that long.72 Some jurists will go so far as 
to permit a wife in some circumstances to raise a case to a judge if her 
husband refuses to have sex with her at least once every four months, 
as he is required to do. The judge will then direct the husband either 
to undertake this marital obligation and have sex with his wife, or 
pronounce a divorce.73 If he refuses to do either, the judge can issue 
the divorce. This, however, seems to be limited to cases where the 
husband is refusing to have sex out of anger with his wife rather than 
because of travel or other absence.74 Hence, for example, if a husband 
is involuntarily absent from his wife for a period of time (for 
                                                            
67.  See SISTANI, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 531. 
68.  See id. at 3 ¶ 504. 
69.  See infra notes 74-79 and accompanying text (giving examples of causes which a 
woman can use to obtain a judicially ordered dissolution of her marriage).  
70.  To be clear, the verbs used to describe sex can take women as subject rather than 
object, but only when the description is of lesbian activity. See, e.g., Jawahir, supra note 34, at 
41:387 (defining lesbianism as “a woman having sex with her like”).  
71.  See SISTANI, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 9. 
72.  See id. at 3 ¶ 341. 
73.  See SAEED AL-HAKIM, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 186. 
74.  See id. 
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example, if he is in prison), then a husband is recommended to 
divorce his wife if she claims she cannot wait for him without 
suffering harm due to unrequited sexual desire.75 However, if he 
refuses, she must wait for him.76  
Moreover, a woman may seek an annulment of her marriage if 
her husband proves to be impotent.77 However, his impotence must be 
entire, meaning he is incapable of having sex with any woman, not 
just the wife making the complaint.78 In sum, women are presumed to 
have sexual desire, and some effort is made to ensure that this desire 
is sated. However, quite plainly, their presumed desires and their 
rights arising as a result, are much diminished relative to that of their 
husbands. 
By contrast, the Shi’i jurists take quite seriously the primary 
rights of a wife that are financial in nature. According to Sistani, a 
husband who does not support his wife can be brought to court, and 
he can be compelled to forfeit assets as necessary to support her in the 
manner to which she is entitled.79 If the husband refuses to do so, and 
he will not divorce his wife, the judge may dissolve the marriage.80 
Similarly, as discussed above, all the jurists agree that a woman is 
entitled to claim her immediate mahr before she enables her 
husband.81 A man who has promised deferred mahr in addition to an 
immediate mahr must pay it no later than the earlier of divorce or 
death. This means that if he promised a large sum (not uncommon 
among husbands certain they will never divorce and unconcerned 
with the financial consequences of their estates after death), a 
decision to pronounce talaq can entail significant financial 
consequences. If he dies, her mahr is a debt due and owing paid 
before any inheritance portions to other family relatives.  
Perhaps the most obvious manner in which women’s financial 
rights supersede their right to sexual satisfaction is revealed in the 
rules respecting missing husbands. If a husband is missing, and 
presumed dead, then jurists draw a sharp distinction between the 
missing husband who has assets to support his wife, and the one who 
                                                            
75.  See SISTANI, supra note 5, at ¶ 359. 
76.  See id. 
77.  See id. at 3 ¶ 267. 
78.  See KHU’I, supra note 5, at 2 ¶ 1346.   
79.  SISTANI, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 355. 
80.  See id. at 3 ¶ 356. 
81.  See supra note 41 and accompanying quotation. 
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does not.82 As to the former, the wife has no right to dissolution of the 
marriage.83 As to the latter, she does have such a right if he does not 
return after four years and a search has turned up no sign of his 
whereabouts.84 Plainly, this shows that while the jurists are not 
willing to countenance an unsupported wife to the extent that she is 
sexually obedient, they are less perturbed by the presence of a 
sexually frustrated woman with an absent husband. 
C. The Temporary Marriage 
The previous section shows that a permanent marriage grants 
men the opportunity for a fair amount of licit sex with multiple 
partners. At the same time, the sex is hardly free. The man must 
support his wife entirely, and if he fails to do so, she can force him to 
sell his assets or divorce her.85 This acts as an important, realistic 
limitation on the amount of sex a man can really have. 
To address this problem, Shi’ism has developed a particular 
form of marriage, which is not recognized among the Sunni schools, 
known as the temporary marriage.86 Jurists analogize this type of 
marriage to a lease contract, where, effectively, a woman leases, 
rather than sells, her sexual organs for a sum certain during a 
specified term. Thus, the parties need to agree on a lease rate, which 
takes the form of a mahr, and they need to agree on a lease term, 
which takes the form of an expiration date for the marriage. The 
Jawahir makes this comparison explicit in the following passage, 
using primary source material consisting of reports of the statements 
and conduct of Shi’a Islam’s Infallible Imams:87 
                                                            
82.  See id. at 3 ¶ 589. 
83.  See id. 
84.  See id.  
85.  See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text. 
86.  The traditional Shi’i account is that the temporary marriage was permissible during 
the era of the Prophet Muhammad, but that the Sunni schools prohibit it because the second 
caliph declared it prohibited. As the second caliph has no recognizable authority in Shi’i Islam 
at all, such a determination holds no weight within Shi’i jurisprudence. See, e.g., Jawahir, 
supra note 34, at 30:139-40. 
87.  Gleave offers the best summary description of the role of the Imams in Shi’i 
jurisprudence: 
Twelver Shī’ī belief is characterized by a conviction that during the Prophet’s 
lifetime, ‘Alī (his cousin and son-in-law) was designated as leader of the Muslim 
community, and Twelver Shi’ites, unlike other Shī’ī groups, consider there to have 
been twelve such leaders (Imams) descended from (and including) ‘Alī who were 
the rightful leaders of the Muslims. These Imams shared some of the characteristics 
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The mahr is a special condition of the temporary marriage, and 
the contract is void without it, without disagreement and indeed 
by consensus. It is the basis [for the marriage] based on the 
statement of al-Sadiq [Shi’a Islam’s Sixth Imam] ‘there is no 
temporary marriage without two matters: a set time, and a set 
rent. . . .’ And in other report, ‘the women are leased,’ as with the 
statement of al-Baqir [the Fifth Imam] ‘she is leased.’ From this 
the difference is known between the permanent, with whom one 
wishes offspring and the like, and the temporary, from whom one 
desires usufruct and pleasure and the like, as a result of which it 
resembles a lease, and thus the mahr is compensation for the 
lease and a condition for its validity.88 
Later jurists, no doubt aware of how the matter might be 
perceived among the Shi’a masses, do not actually discuss the 
temporary marriage in such commercial terms. The rules, however, 
are the same—the temporary marriage requires a set price, meaning 
there is no “mahr of equivalence” as with a permanent marriage,89 
and it requires a set term, meaning the date at which the marriage 
contract ends must be specified.90 As with a permanent marriage, 
there is no limitation on the mahr in terms of value so long as the 
parties agree.91 It is supposed to be paid immediately, though it can be 
paid in installments if there is fear that the wife might not carry out 
her obligations of enablement during the specified period.92 
Similarly, there is no limitation on the length of the time period, 
except at the margins. Sistani thus specifically indicates that an hour 
or less would be acceptable, as would a year or more.93 The Jawahir 
indicates that there is some doubt over a period so short that sexual 
pleasure is not possible, comparing it to the transaction of an 
incompetent party trading for something for which there is no benefit 
or purpose.94 The Jawahir reaches the same conclusion as to a 
                                                                                                                                     
of the Prophet Muhammad (such as sinlessness—’işma) and their words and actions 
are considered (along with those of the Prophet) by Twelver Shi’ites as sources of 
legal and religious guidance (Sunna).  
ROBERT GLEAVE, INEVITABLE DOUBT: TWO THEORIES OF SHI’I JURISPRUDENCE 1 (Studies in 
Islamic Law and Society Ser. No. 12, 2000). 
88.  Jawahir, supra note 34, at 30:162. 
89.  See SISTANI, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 233; KHU’I, supra note 5, at 2 ¶ 272. 
90.  See KHU’I, supra note 5, at 2 ¶ 1302. 
91.  See SISTANI, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 236; KHU’I, supra note 5, at 2 ¶ 1304. 
92.  See SISTANI, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 239; Jawahir, supra note 34, at 30:164-165. 
93.  See SISTANI, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 16. 
94.  See Jawahir, supra note 34, at 30:176. 
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contract that would extend beyond the life of either contracting 
party.95 Later leading jurists make no mention of shorter time periods, 
though they do agree that a term longer than the expected life of 
either of the marrying parties is problematic. They are divided, 
however, over whether such a term would result in a void contract or 
a permanent marriage.96  
Beyond this, there are other differences from a permanent 
marriage that limit obligations that the respective parties might find 
entangling. Most importantly, there is no support obligation imposed 
on a husband during a temporary marriage. While this obviously 
works to the advantage of the husband, it also leaves the wife 
comparatively unconstrained. There is no marital home for a wife to 
be obligated to remain in, after all, if the husband has no obligation to 
supply it. A temporary wife can thus leave her home any time she 
wishes, except to the extent that it interferes with her husband’s right 
to sex.97 This greatly increases her relative freedom, particularly when 
combined with the fact that she may contract to limit the enjoyments 
that a husband derives from her. This can include anything from the 
number of times that the husband may have sex with her,98 to the 
times of day in which sex is to take place,99 to sex acts that 
specifically exclude penetration.100 She could, therefore, condition the 
contract on sex at night exclusively, and then be free to enter and 
leave the home as much as she wished during the day without her 
husband’s permission.  
Three additional distinctions deserve mention. First, neither 
party inherits from the other in the manner that a permanent spouse 
does.101 Second, while Shi’ism does not permit a Muslim man to 
                                                            
95.  See id. at 30:175-176. 
96.  Compare KHU’I, supra note 5, at 2 ¶ 272, and SAEED AL-HAKIM, supra note 5, at 3 
¶ 126 (indicating that a longer term results in a permanent marriage), with SISTANI, supra note 
5, at 3 ¶ 244 (indicating that a longer term results in a void contract). 
97.  See SISTANI, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 257. 
98.  See id. at 3 ¶ 250; SAEED AL-HAKIM, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 127 (indicating that 
supplying a number of times to have sex in place of a time period in a temporary marriage is 
not permissible as obligatory precaution, but that it can be a condition added to the contract in 
addition to a time period). 
99.  See SISTANI, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 250. 
100.  See id. at 3 ¶ 337(1); KHU’I, supra note 5, at 2 ¶ 1314. 
101.  See Jawahir, supra note 34, at 30:190. Islamic law does not permit a party to 
devise more than a third of their estate by bequest. TUCKER, supra note 15, at 138. The 
balance is distributed to relatives according to an elaborate distribution system, the details of 
which lie far beyond the scope of this Article. Id. at 138-39. It suffices to note that Shi’ism 
grants spouses inheritance rights only when they are contracted in a permanent, rather than 
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marry anyone but a Muslim woman permanently,102 it does permit 
Muslim men (but not women) to marry followers of Abrahamic 
faiths, such as Christians and Jews, in a temporary marriage.103 
Finally, a temporary marriage with a fornicator is permissible, though 
it is disfavored.104 If the fornicator becomes particularly well known 
for her fornication, the marriage becomes impermissible.105  
There are no limits on the number of temporary wives a husband 
can take. In the words of Grand Ayatollah Muhsen al-Hakim, even a 
thousand is permissible.106 A woman may have only one partner at a 
time and she must wait two menstrual cycles before taking another.107 
No waiting period applies to women in menopause,108 those too 
young to menstruate,109 or where there has been no penetration.110 
This means that a woman who has stipulated a lack of penetration in 
her marriage contract, and holds to it, is free to conclude serial 
temporary marriages without restriction. 
There are other differences that exist vis-à-vis the permanent 
marriage,111 but this brief review helps to demonstrate the wide 
                                                                                                                                     
temporary, marriage. See SISTANI, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 954(1)-(2) (setting forth inheritance 
rights for permanent spouses).  
102.  SISTANI, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 205; KHU’I, supra note 5, at 2 ¶ 1287(4). Generally, 
this is regarded as an obligatory precaution, meaning that the permissibility of marrying a 
person of the book is sufficiently uncertain that a believer is obligated to avoid it as potentially 
problematic. Sunnism has a very different rule, specifically permitting the marriage of Muslim 
men (but not women) to followers of Abrahamic faiths.   
103.  See SISTANI, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 232; KHU’I, supra note 5, at ¶ 1287(4); Jawahir, 
supra note 34, at 30:155. 
104.  SISTANI, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 261; KHU’I, supra note 5, at ¶ 1303; Jawahir, supra 
note 34, at 30:159. 
105.  See sources cited supra note 104.  
106.  See URWA, supra note 5, at 14:94-95; see also KHU’I, supra note 5, at 2 ¶ 1304 
(“The temporary wife is not limited to a number, so a man is permitted to enjoy what he 
wishes among women [in temporary marriage].”). 
107.  See KHU’I, supra note 5, at ¶ 1310 (pointing out different rules for, inter alia, 
pregnant women, the widowed, those in menopause, and those who do not menstruate for 
medical or other reasons); SISTANI, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 259.   
108.  See SISTANI, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 259; KHU’I, supra note 5, at ¶ 1310.   
109.  See sources cited supra note 108.   
110.  See SISTANI, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 259; see also Jawahir, supra note 34, at 30:196 
(setting forth a waiting period of two months if there has been penetration). Notably, the 
Jawahir does indicate that the waiting period for a widow following a temporary marriage is 
four months and ten days, even if there has been no penetration. See Jawahir, supra note 34, at 
30:200. 
111.  Most notably, a husband has no right to the unilateral talaq divorce in a temporary 
marriage. See Jawahir, supra note 34, at 30:188; KHU’I, supra note 5, at ¶ 1319. It is unclear 
precisely what the point of a divorce would be when the husband has no support obligation, 
nor is he limited in the number of wives he can take, meaning he is not freeing himself of any 
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variety of sexual arrangements that are rendered licit by virtue of the 
temporary marriage. Plainly, the relationships are of the sort where 
the man’s primary objective would be sexual satisfaction and a 
woman’s would be financial in nature, precisely as was the case for 
permanent marriage. Nevertheless, within this rubric, marriage is 
considerably more flexible as to form. It can include, for example, 
everything from manual masturbation of a husband by a temporary 
wife once for a ten-minute period for the mahr of US$ 10, to three 
years of sex in exchange for law school tuition and an apartment, paid 
in installments over the life of the temporary marriage. Almost 
anyone could afford it, and almost anyone could engage in it. 
D. Marriage as Recommended 
The previous Sections highlighted the various forms of sex in 
which a person may engage in a permissible fashion within Shi’i 
Islam. The purpose of this Section is to show that the matter is not 
merely a question of permissibility. The nikah is recommended, in 
strong terms, as to all forms. 
The following are from the opening pages of the Book of the 
Nikah of Grand Ayatollah Muhsen al-Hakim, the primus inter pares 
of the high scholars of the Najaf seminaries in the middle of the 
twentieth century: 
The nikah is recommended on its own by consensus, by the 
Qur’an, and by the example of the Prophet according to 
numerous and indeed incontrovertible reports. God the Exalted 
has said, “Engage in nikah the unmarried among you, and the 
righteous among your male and female slaves. If they are poor, 
God will enrich them from his bounty, for God is bounteous and 
knowledgeable.” And in the Prophetic tradition, “Nikah is my 
practice, and he who finds my practice distasteful is not my 
follower.” And from the Commander of the Faithful, “Marry, for 
the Apostle of God said, ‘whoever desires to follow my practice, 
my practice is marriage.” And from the Prophet, “what is 
established is God’s love for marriage. And from the Prophet, 
                                                                                                                                     
obligation by divorcing a temporary wife. That said, a husband is free to “gift” his wife the 
remainder of her time, which effectively works to dissolve the union in the same way that a 
divorce normally would. See SISTANI, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 249 (indicating that a husband 
wishing to extend the time of a temporary marriage cannot do so during its existing term, so he 
must gift his wife the remainder of her time before concluding a second contract with her for 
the additional time); Jawahir, supra note 34, at 30:196 (referring to the waiting period of a 
woman where the contract has expired or where the time has been gifted by the husband). 
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“whoever marries has completed half of his religion, so let him 
be aware of God with the other half.” 
 
What one learns from the sum of the reports is that the love of 
women is recommended . . . .  
What is established from some of the reports is the disfavoring of 
bachelorhood . . . .  
 
The recommendation [to marry] does not end with one woman, 
but rather polygamy is favored as well. God the Exalted has said, 
“Engage in nikah with those who are good for you among 
women—two or three or four.” And it is clear that the 
recommendation for the nikah is not specific to the permanent or 
temporary marriage, but rather broader than them, and includes 
the concubinage of female slaves.112  
This notion that marriage is recommended, that the 
recommendation exists irrespective of whether the marriage is 
permanent or temporary, and that multiple marriage is favored over 
monogamy, is reinforced in other accounts. In offering its support for 
polygamy, the Jawahir specifically takes issue with the quite common 
progressive position that, in fact, the Qur’an either highly discourages 
polygamy or prohibits it outright because it conditions the practice on 
equal treatment in verse 4:3, and then indicates in verse 4:129 that 
such equal treatment is not possible.113 The following is the relevant 
passage from that source: 
More than one [wife] is favored if needed without doubt, and 
even if not needed, according to the stronger opinion in order to 
ease hardship according to some texts, because in the excess is 
the increase of offspring and the Muslim community, and to 
address needs when they cannot be addressed with a single wife, 
such as during her menstrual period or when she is sick or 
otherwise. It is said, as to the statement of God the Exalted, 
“engage in nikah with those who are good for you among 
                                                            
112.  URWA, supra note 5, at 14:3-5 (quoting THE HOLY QUR’AN 4:3, 24:32). Within 
Shi’ism, the term “Commander of the Faithful” refers to one person alone, and that is Ali b. 
Abi Talib, the first Infallible Imam, son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad. See ROY 
MOTTAHEDEH, IN THE MANTLE OF THE PROPHET 186, 279 (2d. ed. 2007) (referencing Imam 
Ali as “Commander of the Faithful”). 
113.  Tucker summarizes this position in her discussions of modern Muslim debates 
concerning polygamy. TUCKER, supra note 15, at 77-79. 
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women,” that it is an authorization, the lowest level [of 
permission] as to the matter. But based on the research that 
follows, with the Will of God, you will learn that [the position] 
disfavoring more than one is clearly weak, in particular after 
what al-Iyasi reported from al-Sadiq [Shi’i Islam’s Sixth Imam], 
“in all things there is immodest extravagance, except as to 
women,” among other reports. 
As for the statement of God the Exalted, “you will not be able to 
deal equally, even if you strive,” what is meant by equal is not 
equality in support and intimacy, so that combining [the verses] 
leads to [polygamy] being abandoned. This is because it is a 
possible matter [i.e. polygamy is permissible], so it is not correct 
to deny the ability to [treat equally]. If it was going to be 
prohibited, [God] would not permit the combination of obligating 
equality and then rendering it impossible by necessity. In fact, 
what is meant by equality is as to all aspects, and love and 
compassion especially, as reports have stated. This is the equality 
that you will not be able to achieve, even if you strive. It cannot 
be combined with the statement of God the Exalted that, “if you 
fear you cannot treat [multiple wives] equally, then one,” with a 
meaning of equality that is impossible, because [polygamy] is 
recommended, even in poverty . . . .114 
In other words, according to the Jawahir, verse 4:3 obligates 
polygamous husbands to treat their wives “equally” or to be 
monogamous. However, its meaning of “equally” must be different 
than that set forth in verse 4:129, where treating wives “equally” is 
described as impossible, or God would have prohibited in verse 4:129 
that which he permitted in verse 4:3, a conclusion the Jawahir finds 
self-evidently absurd. The reconciliation, according to the Jawahir, 
lies in understanding the word “equally” to mean, in the first case, 
where it is a condition of polygamy, merely equal devotion of time 
and resources to each wife, while in the second case, where the 
Qu’ran indicates that equality is impossible, it means equal love for 
each spouse.115 
In any event, jurists following Hakim, from Khu’i to Saeed al-
Hakim to the current primus inter pares in Najaf, Grand Ayatollah 
                                                            
114.  Jawahir, supra note 34, at 29:35. 
115.  That the verses are capable of other interpretations less embracing of polygamy, 
and that those less predisposed to the practice might read them differently as a result, seems 
rather obvious. As Tucker has described, the position that the Jawahir dismisses as absurd is 
adopted with some vigor by leading Muslim progressives today. TUCKER, supra note 15, at 
78-79. This is a matter beyond the scope of this Article to address, however. 
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Sistani, have been far more circumspect in their exhortations. They do 
not challenge the earlier determinations, nor do they suggest that no 
matter how many women one has married, permanently and 
temporarily, it cannot possibly be immoderate extravagance, for there 
is no such thing when it comes to sex with women. Rather, at most, 
they repeat the earlier determinations that marriage is “recommended” 
and do not elaborate further.116 This appears to be what I describe 
elsewhere as “strategic juristic omission,” or a means by which the 
jurists manage social expectations (which do not include men having 
as many permanent and temporary wives as possible) on the one 
hand, with juristic rules (which very much exhort this) on the other.117  
Strategic juristic omissions aside, it can only be described as the 
clear position of the modern Shi’i juristic academies that not only may 
a man engage in sex with a substantial number of women, but rather 
that he should. The Christian notion of comparing marriage to the 
relationship of Christ to the Church is one that the jurists would find 
patently ridiculous.118 The primary purpose of marriage is to render 
sex licit, not to create some sort of celestial union, and one should 
engage in a great deal of it with a large number of women to satisfy 
this intense earthly need. In Hakim’s words, God disfavors 
bachelorhood, and He recommends the nikah—with a permanent wife 
whom one supports, with a temporary wife to whom one has paid a 
mahr in advance, and with female slaves one owns.119  
While the recommendation to marry certainly applies to women, 
the fact that a woman may only be married to a single man at any 
given time largely narrows the choices available to her, or to the 
guardian entitled to make marriage decisions for her, as the case may 
be.120 She can enter or be entered into a permanent marriage, which 
grants her a right to a mahr, to support, and to a share of her 
husband’s inheritance, though her ability to exit that marriage is 
severely curtailed. In the alternative, she can enter or be entered into a 
                                                            
116.  See, e.g., SISTANI, supra note 5, at 7. In his own compendium, Khu’i does not 
even describe marriage as recommended, but omits all of the controversial portions of the 
Book of Nikah, and proceeds straight to rules concerning marriage. 
117.  See Haider Ala Hamoudi, The Political Codification of Islamic Law: A Closer 
Look at the Draft Shi’i Personal Status Code of Iraq, 33 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 
(forthcoming 2015). 
118.  See Patrick McKinley Brennan, Of Marriage and Monks, Community and 
Dialogue, 48 EMORY L.J. 689, 702 (1999) (citation omitted). 
119.  See supra note 113 and accompanying quotation. 
120.  The phenomenon of child marriage, and the corresponding power of a guardian to 
make marital decisions for his minor children, is described in detail in Part IV.A infra. 
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temporary marriage, which grants her only a mahr, but does not 
confine her in a marital bond indefinitely. There is some broad 
equivalence to the Western dichotomy of the virgin and the whore,121 
though it is important to note that both archetypes in the Shi’i model 
are contemplated by the normative system, and both are living within 
the confines of its rules.122  
II. SEXUAL LIMITATIONS 
The previous Section demonstrates the manner in which the 
jurists of Shi’i Islam presume that human beings, and men in 
particular, have an intense need for a great deal of sex, ideally with 
multiple partners, and they have developed rules that satisfy that 
desire. On its own, this does little to prevent broad licentiousness in 
society. If anything, it seems to facilitate it. Yet a Prophetic statement 
broadly reported by jurists is that one who marries has completed half 
of his religion, and, with the other half, he is supposed to be aware of 
God.123 The purpose of all of the sex of the nikah, then, is to satiate an 
intense human desire, for the purpose of freeing a person to be 
rendered more aware of the Divine. 
The manner in which this is done in Shi’ism is quite interesting. 
Effectively, Shi’ism recommends the relief of sexual desire in a 
manner that distances sexual activity from the pursuit of licentious 
pleasure for its own sake. Or, to put the matter more directly, ideal 
sex is not intended to be fun so much as God-centered and satiating in 
a manner that enables the believer to get back to the business of 
worshiping God properly.  
This is obvious as early as the wedding night. It is recommended 
that the marriage be conducted at night,124 with a party,125 and that 
before the consummation, both husband and wife pray a short 
                                                            
121.  For a general description of the virgin/whore dichotomy, and its relevance in cases 
involving rape, see Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Rape, Race, and Representation: The Power of 
Discourse, Discourses of Power, and the Reconstruction of Heterosexuality, 49 VAND. L. REV. 
869, 929-41 (1996). 
122.  It is worth noting that the juristic description of temporary and permanent 
marriage being equally favored is probably where the Shi’i normative system diverges from 
actual practice in at least some Shi’i societies the most dramatically. This is addressed in brief 
in the conclusion.   
123.  See URWA, supra note 5, at 14:3; Jawahir, supra note 34, at 29:13; see also 
SISTANI, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 7 (quoting the first half of this report, but not the second). 
124.  See SISTANI, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 4; Jawahir, supra note 34, at 29:41.  
125.  See SISTANI, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 4; URWA, supra note 5, at 14:8-9. 
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prayer.126 After this, the husband is to lay his hand on his wife’s 
forehead and make a short invocation to God, the entirety of which is 
“God, on your Book have I married her, and in your trust I have taken 
her, and with your words I have rendered her vagina permissible, so if 
something comes from her uterus, let it be a devoted Muslim and not 
a polytheist of Satan.”127 Then he is to order her to do the same and 
ask God for a son.128  
The Jawahir offers an explanation for this somewhat unusual 
prayer, and in particular its reference to polytheism and Satan: 
When a man comes close to a woman, and he sits in his position, 
Satan is present. However, if he remembers the name of God, 
Satan turns away. If he does it without remembering the name, 
then Satan enters his penis. And it must be done by them both 
[i.e. the husband and wife], because the zygote is one.129 
Later jurists such as Sistani and Khu’i, writing for more contemporary 
and rational audiences, do not invoke the image of Satan actually 
entering a man’s genitalia. The references to Satan, however, continue 
to exist in the invocation itself, which is sufficient.130 When it comes 
to performing the sexual act, Satan lurks, and it is important to invoke 
the name of God to keep him away. 
The theme of God-centered sex used to ward off evil continues 
far beyond the wedding night. Hence, “it is recommended that one 
recite the names of God during sex, and that the parties have 
performed ritual ablution, in particular if the woman is pregnant, and 
that [the husband] ask God to grant him a blessed, devout, innocent 
and male child.”131 Again, the Jawahir (in contrast to more 
contemporary jurists) makes explicit mention of the fact that a failure 
to do so will cause Satan to come near, and this could result in the 
child being his spawn.132 
By contrast, “the looking at the vagina of a woman, and 
especially inside it, during sex or otherwise” is disfavored, as is 
“talking during sex other than in the remembrance of God, and in 
                                                            
126.  SISTANI, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 4; KHU’I, supra note 5, at 2 ¶ 1230; Jawahir, supra 
note 34, at 29:42. 
127.  Jawahir, supra note 34, at 29:44; see also SISTANI, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 4; KHU’I, 
supra note 5, at 2 ¶ 1230. 
128.  See SISTANI, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 4; KHU’I, supra note 5, at 2 ¶ 1230. 
129.  See Jawahir, supra note 34, at 29:44. 
130.  See sources cited supra note 127. 
131.  SISTANI, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 5; see also URWA, supra note 5, at 14:9-10. 
132.  See Jawahir, supra note 34, at 29:45. 
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particular a great deal of it, especially from the man.”133 The fear 
expressed by the Jawahir is that if the husband sees the vagina, the 
child will be rendered blind by what his father has seen, and if the 
father speaks during sex, the child will be rendered deaf by what he 
has heard.134 Again, unsurprisingly, contemporary jurists recite the 
same prohibitions, but do not offer any justifications for them 
concerning the likelihood of future disabilities.135 
But the most interesting expression of disfavor concerns the 
performance of sex when naked. After all, such an act would 
necessarily add an important licentious and sensual element to sex. As 
such, it is soundly disfavored as well.136 Yet in laying out the rule, the 
Jawahir’s characteristic reasoning, concerning risks to the future 
character of the child, appears to lose its coherence. The disfavoring 
of naked sex arises because, the Jawahir explains, “this is the act of 
donkeys, and the angels will depart from between them, and the child 
will be born an executioner.”137 Unlike the examples involving 
looking at a wife’s vagina (where the child goes blind) or speaking to 
a wife during sex (where the child goes deaf), the connection as 
between naked sex and becoming an executioner is rather remote.138 
Even more bizarre is the reference to donkeys, which presumably 
never wear clothes, during sex or otherwise, and which are hardly 
alone in the animal kingdom in this regard. The need to disfavor 
enjoyable sex seems to have overtaken even the logic of superstition 
and fable. As for the modern jurists, in this case as with the others, 
they take the easier approach of merely repeating the same rule 
disfavoring naked sex without seeking to offer any sort of justification 
for it.139 
In any event, whether or not the jurist actually indicates 
precisely why a particular act is disfavored, whether it be naked sex, 
talking during sex, or looking at a vagina, the fact remains that it is, 
by broad consensus of juristic authorities. What a person is supposed 
                                                            
133.  See Jawahir, supra note 34, at 29:59-60. 
134.  See id.   
135.  URWA, supra note 5, at 14:10-11; SISTANI, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 5.   
136.  Jawahir, supra note 34, at 29:57. 
137.  See id. at 29:57. 
138.  The term used for executioner, jallad, arises from the root verb to “lash” or to 
“whip,” and it also means in another form “skin” or “leather.” ARABIC ENGLISH DICTIONARY: 
THE HANS WEHR DICTIONARY OF MODERN WRITTEN ARABIC 154 (Cowan ed. 4th ed. 1979) 
[hereinafter WEHR]. This may create a connection of sorts between naked sex (involving a 
great deal of visible skin), and an executioner, but it is hardly a direct or natural one. 
139.  See, e.g., SISTANI, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 5; KHU’I, supra note 5, at 2 ¶ 1231. 
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to be doing when having sex is invoking the name of God to ward off 
evil and asking Him for a blessed and innocent son, while clothed and 
not speaking to his wife. It is difficult to imagine how sex could be 
rendered any more God-centered and less physically pleasurable than 
this.   
Beyond these rules, there are a panoply of rules that are not 
about the performance of sex, but instead impose bewildering 
limitations on when and where it can be performed. The following 
representative example appears in Grand Ayatollah Hakim’s 
compendium: 
 
Disfavored is sex on the night of a lunar eclipse, or the day of a 
solar eclipse. During the day or night that there is a black, yellow 
or red windstorm. The day of an earthquake. Indeed on any day 
during which a fearsome event occurs. Similarly, it is disfavored: 
at noon; from the setting of the sun until the midpoint of the 
night; on a moonless night; after dawn until the rising of the sun; 
on the first night of every month except Ramadan, when it is 
favored; at the midpoint of each month; during a trip where there 
is no water for washing; between the call to prayer and the start 
of prayer; on Eid al-Adha; on a boat; facing toward the direction 
of prayer [i.e. Mecca] or having one’s back to it; on a road . . . ; 
after a wet dream but before ablution or washing; sex when the 
man or woman is dyed [i.e. with henna]; upon being full [from 
food and drink] when sex is taking place; under a fruit bearing 
tree; on the roofs of buildings; in the sun without a cover. . . .  
Favored is sex on Monday, Tuesday, Thursday and Friday, and 
on Thursday at noon, and on Friday in the afternoon, and it is 
favored when the wife is inclined towards it.   .140 
The Jawahir characteristically offers somewhat antiquated and 
unsatisfactory justifications for these rules that modern jurists do not 
mention. For example, a child conceived before the midpoint of the 
night might be a witch who prefers this world over the next; a child 
                                                            
140.  URWA, supra note 5, at 14:10-11. It should be noted that similar rules appear in 
Grand Ayatollah Sistani’s compendium, and that of Grand Ayatollah Khu’i as well. See  
SISTANI, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 5; KHU’I, supra note 5, at ¶ 1231. The rule respecting henna does 
not appear in the Jawahir, though earlier jurists suggest that a man who is wearing henna 
during sex will have a son who is khuntha, meaning that he carries both male and female 
genitalia, as further described in Part IV.A.2. See 20 SHAYKH AL HURR AL ‘AMILI, TAFSIL 
WASAI’L AL-SHI’A 124-25 (The Ahl ul Bayt Institute for the Preservation of Culture, Qum 
1994) (d. 1693). 
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conceived at the start or the middle of the month might “miscarry, go 
insane or be a leper;” and a child conceived on a boat is in danger 
because the lack of stability in moving water.141   
With or without justifications, not only are the rules rather 
burdensome, but, in addition, they are not coherent enough to be 
particularly easy to follow. It is one thing to establish a series of 
burdensome rules and procedures on how to slaughter an animal.142 A 
butcher could readily internalize these procedures and then perform 
these duties without having to think about them each time. The same 
is not true for the rules set forth concerning intercourse. It would take 
quite high levels of attentiveness to follow all of them. It is not merely 
a matter of remaining clothed, removing henna and reciting God’s 
name, which could be internalized. It is also a matter of ensuring that 
particular times of the day, particular days of the week, and particular 
times of the month, seemingly random ones, are avoided. Similarly, 
sex in particular places, such as boats, roads and roofs of buildings, 
must be avoided, and even during sex, excessive moving would 
probably not be a good idea, if a believer actually wanted to avoid 
facing, or having their back to, the direction of prayer. The amount of 
consideration that would have to be given to the matter during each 
and every sexual encounter would be significant. 
But perhaps this is the very point. That is, the rules force one to 
think about permissible sex each time, and to organize one’s sexual 
activity each time in a manner that accords with the preferences of the 
Divine. By so doing, the panoply of rules, even if not explicitly about 
the remembrance of God, effectively render it so by requiring such 
high levels of attentiveness. In this way, the profane and licentious 
world is left as far behind as possible. 
There is one important limitation to this, however, that bears 
emphasis. All of the rules set forth above fall into the category of the 
recommended and the disfavored, rather than the required or 
prohibited. There is not much that Shi’i Islam absolutely mandates in 
terms of formalities of sex as between husband and wife. Even anal 
sex, which is generally prohibited among Sunnis,143 is only strongly 
disfavored within Shi’ism.144  
                                                            
141.  See Jawahir, supra note 34, at 29:55-56, 60. 
142.  In fact, Shi’ism has such elaborate rules. See, e.g., SISTANI, supra note 5, at 3 ¶¶ 
838-867. 
143.  Certainly modern Sunni opinion has trended strongly toward the position that anal 
sex between husband and wife is a major sin, so much so that it can be a cause for divorce. 
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In short, sex is supposed to be God-centered and free of anything 
that might increase sexual desire and with it licentiousness, including 
looking at a wife’s genitalia or being naked during sex. Yet it does not 
have to be.145 The fact is that a husband who engages in naked marital 
sex on a boat on the first day of the lunar month while facing Mecca, 
staring into his wife’s vagina, and offering lewd comments that do not 
involve the recitation of the names of God, commits no sin. He 
merely fails to please God in the manner that God would prefer him 
to. The next Section addresses the limitations on sexual pleasure that 
constitute not merely recommendations or expressions of disfavor, 
but actual sins, and in fact crimes, meriting punishment not only in 
the afterlife, but in the life of this world as well.  
III. PROHIBITED SEX 
A. On Heterosexual Fornication 
As the previous Parts make clear, the main manner in which 
Shi’ism seeks to suppress licentiousness within society is not through 
significant restrictions on marital sex. Rather, the licentious society is 
avoided through strict prohibition of nonmarital sex and attendant 
rules designed to foreclose the very possibility of it. 
                                                                                                                                     
See, e.g., Shaykh Muhammad Saalih al-Munajjid, Does Anal Intercourse Cancel the Marriage 
Contract?, ISLAM QUESTION AND ANSWER (Sept. 7, 2015), http://islamqa.info/en/6792; 
Personal Status Court, Karkh, Decision No. 5772 of December 31, 1998, reprinted in CASES 
OF THE PERSONAL STATUS COURTS 900-01 (Judge Rabi Muhammad al-Zahawi ed., 2013) 
(granting a wife a marital dissolution for her husband’s anal penetration); cf. HABIB, supra 
note 15, at 214 (describing classical Hanafi opinion as deeming marital anal sex as a “minor 
indiscretion”). 
144.  See, e.g., URWA, supra note 5, at 14:61-62 (“The stronger opinion, in accordance 
with the majority, is the permissibility of penetrating the wife or the female slave anally, with 
strong disfavor. The more precautionary position is to avoid it, in particularly if she does not 
agree to it.”).  
145.  It should probably be noted that there are some limitations on sex that can take 
place in the context of a marital union, but they lie very much at the margins. Most 
prominently, there is a prohibition against sex during a menstrual period or during bleeding 
accompanying childbirth. See, e.g., KHU’I, supra note 5, at 1 ¶¶ 228, 257. Such rules appear to 
be more closely related to a general obsession over the ritual impurity of menstrual blood that 
is beyond the scope of this paper than they are to any sort of direct regulation of sexual 
intercourse to ensure that it remains God-centered. After all, women in these conditions also 
cannot be divorced, nor are they permitted to fast, pray, or stay in the mosque for long periods. 
See id. at 1 ¶¶ 227-230, 257. 
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The core of this lies in the Islamic crime known as zina, or 
“fornication.” It is the scriptural crime par excellence,146 almost 
always appearing first in the Shi’i juristic manuals.147 The Jawahir 
spends over one hundred pages on this crime alone.148 To put it 
simply, “fornication is realized by the direct insertion of a person’s 
penis beyond the point of circumcision in the vagina of a woman 
forbidden to him, in the absence of a contract, ownership, or doubt 
(concerning a lawful relationship).”149 In other words, slavery aside, 
                                                            
146.  The general manner in which Islamic law divides criminal punishments—beyond 
those concerning retaliation for physical injury, which properly belong in the realm of private 
law—is into scriptural crimes, referred to as the hudud, and discretionary ones, referred to as 
the ta’zir. See, e.g., RUDOLPH PETERS, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN THE LAW OF ISLAM: 
THEORY AND PRACTICE FROM SIXTEENTH TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 7 (Themes in 
Islamic Law Ser. No. 2, 2006). The scriptural crimes are commonly described as having fixed 
penalties, while the discretionary ones are not. See LANGE, supra note 15, at 216-17. The other 
frequent description of the scriptural crimes, at least among some schools, is that they are 
“entirely or predominantly” rights of God rather than men, and therefore cannot be waived by 
men. See TUCKER, supra note 15, at 184; PETERS, at 53. The basic problem is that at least 
within Shi’ism, neither distinction works particularly well. Clearly, some of the scriptural 
crimes can be waived by men. For example, the Imam can, in some circumstances, reduce or 
eliminate the punishment for fornication if the sole evidence for it is a confession. See KHU’I, 
supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 140 (taking the broader view that the Imam can completely pardon any 
fornicator, repentant or not, so long as the sentence was pronounced on the basis of a 
confession); Jawahir, supra note 34, at 41:293 (suggesting a repentant fornicator can have his 
sentence reduced to lashing by the Imam). Moreover, some crimes, such as two men being 
naked under the same blanket, are specifically described as discretionary, despite having fixed 
punishments established for them. Khu’i suggests that the proper punishment for this crime is 
ninety-nine lashes. KHU’I, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 191. This would indicate the sole distinction 
between it and a scriptural crime is that it falls one short of the one hundred lashes that would 
characterize the related scriptural crime, imposed on the third offense according to the 
Jawahir. See Jawahir, supra note 34, at 41:385-386. There is thus some confusion in Shi’i 
juristic manuals as to whether a given act, such as apostasy, is scriptural or discretionary, and a 
wide level of variation among Shi’i jurists concerning how many scriptural crimes there are. 
See Jawahir, supra note 34, at 41:254-258 (describing the confusion and resulting variation). 
Therefore, I do not share Tucker’s view that “no one” took the position that lesbianism was a 
scriptural crime, as both Khu’i and the Jawahir specifically describe it in those terms. See 
KHU’I, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 194 (“The hadd for a lesbian if she is not married is one hundred 
lashes . . . and the more manifest opinion is that the married one is stoned.”); Jawahir, supra 
note 34, at 387 (“The hadd of lesbianism is sex of a woman by another . . . .”). Contra 
TUCKER, supra note 15, at 190. I also, however, do not think the matter is terribly important. It 
suffices to note that lesbianism, along with male-to-male sex, “thighing,” and the other acts 
described in this section, are crimes set forth in the juristic manuals, with severe punishments 
established for them. Whether one wishes to classify them as “discretionary” or “scriptural” is 
purely a matter of taxonomy. 
147.  See KHU’I, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 134; Jawahir, supra note 34, at 41:258. 
148.  See Jawahir, supra note 34, at 41:258-369. 
149.  KHU’I, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 134. 
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any man who has vaginal sex with a person to whom he is clearly not 
married has committed the supreme crime of fornication.  
Fornication may be divided within Shi’ism into four relevant 
categories. The first category is the rape of a woman by a man. The 
man is punished by death in such an instance, and the woman receives 
no punishment at all.150 The second category is the consensual 
fornication of a person who is not what is known as a muhsan. Grand 
Ayatollah Khu’i provides a convenient and concise definition of the 
term muhsan, as follows: 
A man is deemed muhsan upon two conditions: First, that he is 
free [i.e. not a slave], and the second is that he has a permanent 
wife with whom he has consummated a marriage or a female 
slave, and he is able to have sex with her whenever he desires 
and wishes. Thus, if his wife is away, such that he cannot enjoy 
her, or he is imprisoned where he cannot reach her, then the rules 
of the muhsan do not apply to him. 
A woman is deemed muhsan if she is free and she has a 
permanent husband who has consummated his marriage with 
her . . . .151 
Thus, in stark contrast to Sunni Islam,152 the term muhsan 
broadly means one who has the ability to engage in permissible sex at 
the time that the fornication took place.153 If one is not muhsan, 
therefore, one has something of a justification for the unlawful sex, or 
at least enough of a justification to merit a lighter penalty. Hence, the 
non-muhsan man is not killed, but only subject to a punishment of 
100 lashes, one year exile, and the cutting off of all of his hair, and 
possibly his beard as well.154 A woman is only lashed, without hair 
cutting, with the jurists divided over exile.155  
                                                            
150.  See id. at 3 ¶¶ 136, 153; Jawahir, supra note 34, at 41:265, 315. 
151.  KHU’I, supra note 5, at 3 ¶¶ 158-159. 
152.  Sunnism defines muhsan as one who is either currently married, or has been in the 
past. PETERS, supra note 146, at 61. Accordingly, the notion of mitigating the punishment 
because of the lack of existing availability of licit sex is not as pronounced within Sunnism. 
After all, one could be formerly married with no reasonable access to licit sex and yet such a 
person would still be deemed muhsan. 
153.  Admittedly, there is a curious exception in that a person who is engaged in a 
temporary marriage is not a muhsan, despite having access to sex.   
154.  See KHU’I, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 157; Jawahir, supra note 34, at 41:323. 
155.  Compare Jawahir, supra note 34, at 41:328-329 (arguing against exile for a female 
fornicator), with KHU’I, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 157 (stating that a female fornicator does not have 
her hair cut, but that while it is problematic, the better opinion is that she is exiled). 
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By contrast, the muhsan who fornicates—in other words, one 
who has permissible sex available to them and who nonetheless 
engages in impermissible sex—faces one of the harshest punishments 
available under the shari’a. They are stoned to death. The details are 
set forth in the Jawahir as follows: 
It is obligatory to bury the one to be stoned in a hole, by all of the 
sources. . . originating with the Prophet (God’s blessings upon 
him and his progeny) and the Commander of the Faithful [the 
First Imam] (God’s peace upon him), but he is not buried beyond 
his groin. Based on the statement of al-Sadiq [the Sixth Imam] 
(God’s peace upon him), from a reliable source, “the woman is 
buried to her middle, then the Imam stones her, and the people do 
as well, with small stones, but the man is not buried when stoned 
except to his groin. 
The woman is buried to her breast according to the more reliable 
of the reports . . . . Thus, [it is reported] from the Prophet, God’s 
blessings upon him and his progeny, that he buried an older 
woman to her chest, and in other [report] from him, God’s 
blessings on him and his progeny, that he stoned a woman, 
burying her to her nipples . . . . 156 
The death is obviously slow and painful, given the requirement 
of small stones referred to above. This is intentional. As the Jawahir 
explains: 
It is a requirement that the stones are small . . . . What is really 
desired are stones of a moderately small size . . . . Thus it is said 
[the fornicator] is not stoned by extremely small pebbles that will 
torture him by the extent of the striking [of him] while remaining 
alive. And in any event it is not enough to throw one stone that is 
enough to finish him off and to kill him, because this takes it out 
of the meaning of stoning. And because it is in contradiction to 
the reports. The stoned person is not killed by a sword because 
this is inapplicable and is not expiation for his sin, which must be 
punished severely by an act which deters others and draws them 
away from similar deeds.157 
The power of unlawful sex is so strong, in other words, that it is 
not sufficient merely to strike the person at his neck with a sword, 
thereby killing him. This may suffice for other crimes, but not for 
                                                            
156.  Jawahir, supra note 34, at 41:347. 
157.  Id. at 41:355. 
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fornication, where the need to deter, as well as the magnitude of the 
crime committed, mandate a stiffer penalty than death.  
The final category of fornicators consists of those who are older, 
and who are muhsan. This is the group where the fornication is 
deemed the least justifiable. These are people with presumably 
reduced sexual appetites, given their age, and who have avenues to 
relieve any sexual frustration. As to them, they are given the two 
penalties laid out above, in order. First, they are lashed, and then they 
are stoned.158 
The carrying out of the penalty is supposed to be public, so as to 
increase its deterrent effect, as the following passage from the 
Jawahir makes clear: 
Without dispute or difficulty, it is incumbent on the Imam, or 
whoever stands in his place, if he wishes to fulfill the lashing, 
that he informs the people so they may be aware of it and make 
themselves present for it. Indeed it is also incumbent upon him to 
order them to it, as the Commander of the Faithful [the First 
Imam] (God’s peace upon him) did. When he wanted to impose a 
punishment on a man who confessed, he called, “Assembly of 
Muslims! Come out for the execution of this punishment. Let 
none know his companion.” And when he (God’s peace upon 
him) wanted to execute the punishment on a woman who 
confessed to him, he ordered . . . a call to communal prayer and 
then he climbed the pulpit and said, “People! Before you I shall 
depart from this door with this woman to carry out the 
punishment of God. So the Commander of the Faithful invites 
you to leave early, disguised one from the other, and with you are 
your stones.” There are other reports. What is in all of this is 
deterrence to the person and to others for actions like this . . . .159  
Notwithstanding the grisly details, it is extremely important to 
note that the imposition of any penalty for fornication, whether 
lashing or stoning, is nearly impossible as a realistic manner absent a 
confession. This is because of strict evidentiary requirements. Grand 
Ayatollah Khu’i sets forth the rules as follows: 
Fornication is not established by the testimony of two just male 
witnesses. Indeed it requires four male witnesses, or three men 
and two women, or two men and four women, except stoning [as 
opposed to lashing] cannot be established by the latter, nor can 
                                                            
158.  See KHU’I, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 154. 
159.  Jawahir, supra note 34, at 41:353. 
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any other [punishment for fornication] be established by the 
testimony of women alone, or by one man and six women, or by 
the swearing of an oath of one person. 
It is deemed that for testimony for fornication to be accepted, it 
must be directly observed, and if they witnessed it other than 
visually, then the witnessed person is not punished, but the 
witnesses are punished. The witness testimony must be the same 
in time and place, so that if there is a difference in time, or in 
place, fornication is not established, and the witnesses are 
punished. If their differences are other than pursuant to different 
acts or multiple acts—for example, if some of them testified as to 
a certain woman who was fornicated upon from the House of 
Tamim, for example, and others testified that she was from the 
House of Asad, or something similar concerning disputes in 
details, then this does not affect the establishment of fornication 
without question. However, if their differences concerned details 
of the fornication—for example, if some testified that the 
fornicator forced the woman into fornication, and others testified 
as to the absence of force, and that the woman was obedient, then 
in the establishment of the fornication there are problems.160 
Thus, the numerous witnesses must testify as to having 
themselves seen a man’s penis enter a woman’s vagina beyond the 
line of circumcision. They must testify as to it having taken place at 
the same time in the same location. Their failure to do so, or the 
inability to gather the requisite number of witnesses, in fact results in 
the witnesses being guilty of a crime known as qadhf, or unfounded 
accusation, pursuant to which a penalty of eighty lashes is imposed 
against them.161  
Moreover, even pregnancy is not sufficient, in the absence of a 
confession from the woman. As Grand Ayatollah Khu’i notes: 
If a woman is pregnant and has no lord, she is not punished 
because of the possibility that the pregnancy is for a reason other 
than sex, or on account of sex with doubt, rape, or something 
similar.162  
Moreover, even if, somehow, the requisite number of witnesses 
could be gathered, excuses are readily available to avoid the 
imposition of punishment. A woman could always claim to have been 
                                                            
160.  KHU’I, supra note 5, at 3 ¶¶ 142-143. 
161.  This is referenced in the passage quoted in the main text. For more details on the 
idea of qadhf within Shi’ism, see Jawahir, supra note 34, at 41:402-431. 
162.  KHU’I, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 141. 
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raped. By so doing, she avoids the punishment as to herself, though 
this is of little help to her paramour. Moreover, a man having sex with 
an unmarried woman could always claim to be married to her, at least 
in a temporary marriage. In this regard, it is particularly useful that 
Shi’ism requires no witnesses to make a marriage valid,163 and that it 
is concluded orally, thereby making it virtually impossible to establish 
that a couple claiming a marriage somehow did not conclude one.164 
Given all of this, the historic reports in the juristic texts concerning 
the execution of the punishments for fornication are rare and 
invariably involve a confession made to expiate for the sin of 
fornication in the first place.165  
Thus, the purpose of the fornication prohibition is not actually to 
stone very many people, if any at all. Rather, what it successfully 
demonstrates is the severity of the sin of nonmarital sex. This, in turn, 
reinforces the commitment of Shi’i Islam toward placing strict 
limitations on sex so as to ensure the central role of God in the life 
and mind of the believer. Surely the fact that stoning is the penalty for 
fornication would cause any sincere believer to pause before engaging 
in the act irrespective of the possibilities of punishment. One truly 
dedicated to the rules of the jurists would not only engage in sex 
exclusively in the context of a proper marriage contract, permanent or 
temporary, and would not only undertake those actions recommended 
by the jurists during sex (remaining clothed, reciting the names of 
God, avoiding sex on boats and during eclipses and the like), but that 
person would also almost surely not seek to have sex beyond the 
permissible bounds of marriage, either. This is even more likely given 
the severe punishments that are at least theoretically possible. 
Along the same lines, and even more importantly, the strict 
penalties associated with fornication help to explain and justify other 
                                                            
163.  See SISTANI, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 3 (indicating that witnesses are recommended 
rather than required). 
164.  See id. at 3 ¶ 30. 
165.  There are juristic passages that seem to promote the idea of confessing to 
fornication and to receiving expiation through the punishment of stoning. The following is a 
passage from the Jawahir: 
When the stoning is complete, [the stoned person] is buried, after a prayer for 
him. Nor can [a prayer] be neglected without dispute . . . or question. It is 
necessary given that he is a Muslim. From the Prophet as to the stoned woman, 
“she repented in a manner that is equivalent to swearing to seventy people 
from Medina, and is there a better repentance than that she granted her soul to 
God? 
Jawahir, supra note 34, at 41:357-358. 
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rules in the Shi’i canon that limit intermixing between the sexes. 
Most, though not all, of these rules fall within the rubric of what are 
called the Ahkam al-Nadhar, or the Rules on Gazing. Notably, these 
appear early in the juristic manuals in the Book of Nikah.166 In other 
words, where all of the rules on permissible sex appear, there are also 
a series of rules on segregating the sexes, phrased in terms of what 
parts of a body a person of the other sex is allowed to see (and, by 
logical extension, feel or touch).  
Effectively, they create rules based on four categories of 
relationship as between adult men and women. The first concerns the 
intermixing of husband and wife, where, as we have seen, nearly 
everything is permissible.167 Certainly, there is no prohibition against 
looking at or touching any part of the anatomy of a spouse.168 The 
second category is as between a man and the women whom he is not 
permitted to marry. This would not only include parents, siblings, and 
children, but also the parent of an existing or former spouse, or one 
who has shared the same wet nurse.169 In this case, the main 
prohibition is looking at what are known as the “private parts”, or 
‘awra’, of the person in question. There is no other limitation on 
looking, so long as there is no suspicion of sexual attraction between 
the parties.170 The third category is an interesting one, concerning 
looking at a person of the opposite sex whom one is considering 
marrying. Hakim sets out the basic rules, recited in the same basic 
form in other compendia,171 as follows: 
Whoever wishes to marry a woman may look at her face, her 
hands, her hair, and her beauty; indeed it is not too far to say it is 
permissible to look at her entire body except her private parts, 
though out of precaution this would be too much. It does not 
need to be conditioned on her permission and consent. It cannot 
be for a licentious purpose, or with knowledge it is being done by 
force. The look may be repeated if its purpose –knowing her 
condition—is not completed with the first look. . . . And it must 
potentially be by her choice, and if not, then it is not 
                                                            
166.  See, e.g., SISTANI, supra note 5, at ¶¶ 11-29; KHU’I, supra note 5, at 2 ¶¶ 1232-
1234; URWA, supra note 5, at 14:12-61; Jawahir, supra note 34, at 29:63-102. 
167.   This is set forth in detail in Part I supra. 
168.   See SISTANI, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 11; URWA, supra note 5, at 14:23-24. 
169.  See SISTANI, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 13. 
170.  Id. at 3 ¶ 13; URWA, supra note 5, at 14:32-33. 
171.  See, e.g., SISTANI, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 28; Khu’i, supra note 5, at 2 ¶ 1232. 
62 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 39:1 
permissible.172 . . . It is not impossible that the woman may also 
look at the man who wants to marry her, but precaution dictates 
that this not be done. . . 173 
Finally, as to women to whom one is not married, has no 
intention to marry, and is not related to in a manner that prohibits 
marriage, the rules are quite strict, in particular as to women. A man 
is not permitted to look at anything but a woman’s face and hands 
according to some jurists,174 or any part of her at all, out of 
precaution, according to others.175 This creates a parallel obligation on 
her to cover those parts of her body.176 A man has no parallel 
obligation to cover himself.177 
The rules go well beyond mere looking. The shaking of hands is 
likewise forbidden.178 Saeed al-Hakim declares that sitting on a chair 
where a woman has sat earlier is disfavored until the seat cools.179 
The Jawahir even bans the sound of a woman from reaching the ears 
of a man in the following notable passage. 
The blind and the seeing are absolutely not permitted to hear the 
sound of an unrelated woman, if they have sensual desire or 
suspicion of it, out of fear of temptation. Without it [i.e. 
suspicion of sensual desire], what is clear in the texts, the 
principles, the writings, the commentaries, and the summaries is 
that it is prohibited also, for it is part of a woman’s private parts, 
hence listening to it is forbidden. She is thus obligated to cover it 
in all circumstances. Indeed, it is said, this is the predominant 
opinion, and it is incontrovertible based on the statements of the 
consensus [of juristic authorities].180 
It is a sign of the potential for change in religious jurisprudence, 
notwithstanding the apparent resistance thereto in many contexts, that 
                                                            
172.  The distinction the jurists appear to be making is between, on the one hand, 
conditioning the looking at the woman on her consent, which is unnecessary, and, on the other, 
looking at her when the viewer knows that this is being done against her will, which is not 
permissible. That is to say, to look at her without her knowing is presumptively acceptable. 
However, if it is known for a fact that she does not wish to be seen, that wish must be 
respected. 
173.  URWA, supra note 5, at 14:13-17 
174.  SISTANI, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 18 
175.  KHU’I, supra note 5, at 2 ¶ 1233. Exceptions arising out of medical necessity or 
emergency circumstances exist. See, e.g., Jawahir, supra note 34, at 29:87. 
176.  KHU’I, supra note 5, at 2 ¶ 1233. 
177.  Id.; SISTANI, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 19; URWA, supra note 5 at 14:59.   
178.  URWA, supra note 5, at 14:49. 
179.  SAEED AL-HAKIM, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 20. 
180.  Jawahir, supra note 34, at 29:97. 
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this rule, despite the strong manner in which it is stated in an 
authoritative text from the mid nineteenth century, is universally 
rejected among more recent authorities. Nevertheless, the more 
contemporary rule still reveals the same discomfort over women’s 
voices and the subsequent potential for sexual attraction. The 
following appears in Grand Ayatollah Sistani’s compendium, and 
parallel provisions can be found in Khu’i,181 Hakim182 and Saeed al-
Hakim,183 respectively: 
It is permitted to hear the voice of an unrelated woman, so long 
as there is no sensual desire or appetite, nor suspicion thereof, 
just as it is permitted for her to let her voice be heard by 
unrelated men except if there is fear of falling into the forbidden. 
However, it is not permitted to polish or beautify the sound in a 
manner that would normally be enticing for the listener, even if 
he is a relative of hers.184  
The voice, let alone the hair, the body or the physical touch, is a 
potential source of danger. It can be revealed, but only to the extent 
that it does not entice unduly. Otherwise, there is temptation that 
lurks, the possibility that what will ultimately result is fornication—
that deadly serious crime, and dangerous and damnable sin. Given the 
seriousness of that, and given the intense and near debilitating desire 
of human beings toward sexual pleasure, immense precaution must be 
taken to avoid excessive contact between the unmarried, as the Rules 
of Gazing demonstrate. 
B. On Homosexuality 
To summarize the argument thus far, Shi’i Islam presumes that 
human beings, and men in particular, need a great deal of sex to 
function. Shi’i Islam’s normative system is therefore committed to 
ensuring that such sex takes place in established contractual forms 
known as permanent and temporary marriage. These contractual 
forms result in the construction of highly gendered space, with clearly 
defined roles for men and women. That gendered space, and the 
hierarchies resulting therefrom, are thus directly threatened by any 
sort of sexual union that is not similarly gendered. Homosexuality is 
                                                            
181.  KHU’I, supra note 5, at 2 ¶ 1234. 
182.  URWA, supra note 5, at 14:48-49 (recommending out of precaution that a woman 
not let her voice be heard except where necessary). 
183.  SAEED AL-HAKIM, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 17.  
184.  SISTANI, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 29. 
64 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 39:1 
precisely an example of such a union. As Kecia Ali notes in the 
context of Sunni Islam, and as is no less true of Shi’i Islam, “the legal 
structure of Islamic marriage is predicated on a gender-differentiated 
allocation of interdependent claims, which would be thrown into 
chaos by a same sex union.”185 
Moreover, homosexuality poses special dangers that fornication 
does not, because the precautionary measures that can be taken in the 
form of segregation of a person from their own sex are quite limited. 
Sistani reveals this in the following passage: 
It is permissible for a man to look at all but the private parts of 
those of the same sex, whether the one being looked at is old or 
young, good looking or ugly, so long as there is no sexual desire 
or appetite, any suspicion of it, or any fear of falling into sin. It is 
similar for a woman . . . However, the private parts—meaning 
the front [genitalia], the buttocks, and the testicles . . . –looking at 
them is not permissible as for one of the same sex.186  
These limited rules bear remarkable resemblance to the Rules of 
Gazing that exist between a person and those individuals so closely 
related that marriage to such people is never permissible.187 The idea 
seems largely similar. On the one hand, the expectation is that there is 
less likely to be sexual attraction in such circumstances. However, it 
is not impossible for a person to feel sexual attraction to the parent of 
a spouse, for example, let alone someone of the other sex who shared 
a wet nurse with them decades earlier.188 Hence, there is a prohibition 
against looking at genitalia of those one cannot marry, and a 
prohibition on seeing them at all to the extent that there is even the 
suspicion of sexual attraction and falling into sin. More than this is 
not demanded, nor is it particularly feasible to demand that mothers 
and adult children, for example, shield themselves from each other 
more than this. 
The same considerations apply concerning same-sex relations. 
The expectation is that sexual attraction between members of the 
same sex is unlikely. However, it is specifically contemplated as 
possible, because the jurists indicate that if there is such attraction, 
then one must self-segregate from their own sex, and in any event, 
                                                            
185.  ALI, supra note 16, at 95. 
186.  SISTANI, supra note 5, at 3 ¶12. 
187.  For an example of such rules, see SISTANI, supra note 5, at 3 ¶13. 
188.  See id. at 3 ¶13, 106 (concerning child of wet nurse), 155-56 (concerning parents of 
spouses). 
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they cannot look at the genitalia of those of the same sex. Anything 
stricter, such as a rule that men cannot shake hands with one another, 
or that they need to cover their bodies before doing business with one 
another, is neither particularly feasible, nor would it be regarded in 
any real social space as sensible.  
Accordingly, unlike fornication, which can be prevented through 
extraordinary precautions limiting mixing of the sexes, means other 
than extreme segregation need to be used to limit the possibility of 
homosexuality and thereby preserve the highly gendered nikah as the 
sole means through which to relieve sexual desire. These take the 
form of severe criminal punishment, as described below. 
1. Male to Male Anal Penetration 
It is difficult to overstate the extent of the abomination that male 
to male anal sex represents within the Shi’i juristic manuals.189 The 
following representative passage is contained in the Jawahir: 
As for liwat, it is sexual intercourse between two human males, 
through anal penetration or otherwise. [The word] derives from 
the actions of the people of Lot. Its prohibition is one of the 
necessities of the religion, in addition to what is said about it in 
the Clear Book [i.e. the Qur’an], the tradition of the Doyen of the 
Prophets [i.e. the Prophet Muhammad], and his progeny, the 
good and the pure. The Apostle of God, God’s blessings on him 
and his progeny, said “whoever has sex with a boy, on the Day of 
Judgment he shall arrive in a state of uncleanliness that no water 
of the world can purify. God is furious with him, curses him, and 
has prepared Hell for him, and his destiny is calamity.” Then he 
said “the male who mounts a male shakes the Throne by this 
[act]. That man, even if I am at his side, God the Exalted will 
imprison him on the Bridge of Hell, until God finishes the 
accounting of His Creatures, then He shall order him to Hell, and 
He shall torture him on its levels, one by one, until he reaches the 
lowest of them, and he shall never leave there.” The Commander 
of the Faithful [the First Imam], God’s peace upon him, said, “if 
there is one who should be stoned twice, it is the homosexual 
man.” . . . And from al-Sadiq [the Sixth Imam], God’s peace 
                                                            
189. I am not the first to make this observation. Commenting on the Islamic prohibition 
generally, Khaled el-Rouayheb notes the severe treatment of homosexuals in the Shi’i 
tradition, even as compared with the hardly tolerant Sunni juristic tradition. KHALED EL-
ROUAYHEB, BEFORE HOMOSEXUALITY IN THE ARAB-ISLAMIC WORLD, 1500-1800, 121-22 
(2005).  
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upon him, “the inviolability of the anus is greater than the 
inviolability of the vagina. God the Exalted destroyed a people 
because of the inviolability of the anus. But he has not destroyed 
anyone because of the inviolability of the vagina.190  
There is some level of dispute respecting the punishment, in 
particular if the homosexual man in question is not muhsan, given 
conflicting source material on the subject. The Jawahir indicates that 
the rule is death for all who are adult, sane and willing, whether 
master or slave, Muslim or non-Muslim, or muhsan or unmarried.191 
Grand Ayatollah Khu’i suggests that this conclusion, while widely 
held, is doubtful as concerns one who is not muhsan to the extent they 
are the person who is performing the anal penetration.192 Such a 
person should be lashed rather than killed, according to the Grand 
Ayatollah, while the person penetrated should be killed.193 This is also 
the position set forth in the new Iranian Penal Code.194 The distinction 
is quite telling. An unmarried person who uses a man as one might a 
woman is understood to be engaging in behavior that, while sinful and 
indeed criminal, has some justification to it given the presumed 
intense need that men have for sex. The same is not true of the other 
partner, who, by acting out the role of the female, deserves greater 
punishment. 
As for how the gay man is to be killed, again differences appear 
in modern texts. The Jawahir, for example, provides as follows: 
The more widely held opinion . . . is that the Imam may choose 
between striking him with a sword, burning him, stoning him, 
throwing him from a high place, or toppling a wall onto him. . . . 
From al-Sadiq [the Sixth Imam], God’s peace upon him, Khalid 
wrote to Abu Bakr that he came with a man who gave of his 
anus.195 He sought the advice of the Commander of the Faithful 
[the First Imam], God’s peace upon him, who said, “burn him in 
fire, because the Arabs do not regard killing as anything.” And as 
for what I have heard respecting stoning for the muhsan, it is 
understood from the statement of the Commander of the Faithful 
                                                            
190.  Jawahir, supra note 34, at 41:374-375. 
191.  Id. at 41:378. 
192.  KHU’I, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 181.  
193.  Id.  
194.  Islamic Penal Code of Iran (amended 2013), art. 235.   
195.  The repeated references to “giving of the anus” is quite notable, and help to justify 
the conclusions of Grand Ayatollah Khu’i and the Iranian Penal Code, described above, 
differentiating between the punishment imposed on the penetrating male as opposed to the 
penetrated one. 
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[the First Imam], God’s peace upon him, “if there is one who 
should be stoned twice, it is the homosexual man.” Also from 
him, peace be upon him, that he stoned a man in Kufa who gave 
of his anus. Also from him, peace be upon him, that he said of 
liwat, “it is a sin that none have disobeyed God through except 
one community, so He made of them what he recites in His 
Book, respecting stoning, so stone them as God the Mighty and 
Exalted has done.” Also from him, peace be upon him, if a man 
talks like women, and walks like women, and he enables of 
himself so that he engages in nikah as women, so stone him and 
do not leave him alive.”196  
For his part, Grand Ayatollah Khu’i describes the death penalty, 
when applicable, as being undertaken by the sword, stoning, burning, 
or tying the hands and feet together and rolling the man down a 
hill.197 If he is killed by the sword, then, according to the Grand 
Ayatollah, the homosexual’s body is to be burned, with no mention of 
a prayer.198 This is powerful punishment indeed. Even the fornicator 
is given a proper Islamic burial, and a prayer said for his soul.199 
This shows the extent to which modern Shi’i jurists condemn in 
the strongest possible terms male to male sex, even more strongly 
than they do nonmarital heterosexual sex. In so doing, they reference 
source material that describes the anus as more inviolable than the 
vagina, make broad use of the story of Lot as told in the Qur’an and 
call for as severe a series of punishments to be administered as can be 
imagined. This certainly works to create a normative and ethical 
framework wherein homosexuality is not merely shunned, but 
actively despised.  
It does leave important gaps, however, that require 
consideration. The first, obvious one is that it does not cover women 
at all. This would leave women free to engage in lesbian sex as an 
alternative to the permitted nikah, a result which would be as 
destructive to the highly developed and elaborate rules on sex 
                                                            
196.  Jawahir, supra note 34, at 41:381-382. The passage then goes on to suggest this 
final report from Shi’i Islam’s first infallible Imam is of weak provenance, but that it does not 
matter given its broad harmony with the other source material. In fact, while the general 
condemnation of homosexuality is identical, there is a potentially important difference as 
concerns transgenderism. The earlier reports did not seem to implicate much of anything 
concerning a person once a man who becomes a woman. The final one could be understood to 
do just that. This is the subject of the next Part.  
197.  KHU’I, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 188.  
198.  Id.  
199.  Jawahir, supra note 34, at 41:357-358.  
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regulation in Shi’i Islam as the permission of male to male gay sex 
would be, and for the same reasons.  
The second problem is that the evidentiary standards to prove 
liwat are even stricter than those necessary to prove fornication. There 
must be either four serial confessions, or four male witnesses to the 
act, with women’s testimony being irrelevant in their entirety, unlike 
fornication.200 As with fornication, the witnesses are punished with 
lashing if there are an insufficient number of them.201 Moreover, as 
we have seen, the prohibitions on interactions within either sex are 
quite limited. Where fornication can be prevented because a man is 
not even allowed to look at, much less touch, an unrelated woman, 
men can obviously touch each other, thereby rendering the possibility 
of licit homosexuality all the more pressing.  
Hence, while the crime of liwat does create an ethical framework 
that involves the shunning of homosexuality, it may not do enough to 
deter it in the minds of the Shi’i jurists, given how threatening it is to 
the regulation of sex in the normative system they have developed. 
The next two sections address the manner in which Shi’i Islam 
addresses these matters, in a manner that is quite distinct from the 
major Sunni schools.202  
2. “Thighing” 
Interestingly, the Jawahir does not even maintain that liwat 
requires anal penetration, defining it instead as sex between two men, 
“whether through anal penetration or otherwise.”203 It then divides the 
crime into two types, that involving anal penetration, discussed above, 
and that which does not “such as thighing or between the two 
buttocks.”204 Grand Ayatollah Khu’i offers the more common modern 
categorization, creating a separate crime known as “thighing,” which 
he defines broadly as male to male sexual activity that does not 
                                                            
200.  Id. at 41:376-378 (noting that women’s testimony is not admissible, unlike 
fornication); KHU’I, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 180 (same).  
201.  See, e.g., KHU’I, supra note 5, at ¶ 200.  
202.  For the position of the four Sunni schools, see ROUAYHEB, supra note 189, at 118-
21. Suffice it to say, and as Rouayheb himself notes, non-anal sexual activity does not merit 
the same punishment in the Sunni schools as it does in Shi’ism. Id. at 121.  
203.  Jawahir, supra note 34, at 41:374.  
204.  Id. at 41:382.  
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involve anal penetration.205 This is the approach taken in Iran’s most 
recent Penal Code as well.206  
In some ways, the distinction does not matter. In either case, the 
punishment for “thighing”, however categorized, is one hundred 
lashes.207 If the offense is repeated three times (according to some 
sources) or four times (according to others), the offender is put to 
death, according to the jurists, though not Iranian law.208  
However, the apparent evolution from describing “thighing” as a 
form of liwat in the Jawahir to describing it as an independent hadd 
in Iranian law and Grand Ayatollah Khu’i’s compendium has 
important evidentiary ramifications. 
First, the crime of unfounded accusation discussed earlier only 
applies to liwat and fornication, meaning that if “thighing” is not in 
fact a form of liwat, a person is free to testify against an alleged 
offender without the threat of a lashing if a sufficient number of 
witnesses do not corroborate the testimony.209 Moreover, no 
minimum number of witnesses is specified for “thighing” as opposed 
to liwat, which would almost surely mean that the requirement to 
establish “thighing” is the standard two male witnesses rather than 
four.210 In other words, prosecuting homosexuality is becoming easier 
in the current age than it was a century ago. The trend is running in 
precisely the reverse of the direction one might expect. 
That said, even if prosecutions are easier now, the notion of 
prosecuting for licentious same sex acts short of actual “thighing” was 
already very much set in place in the Jawahir. The following passage 
demonstrates this by introducing yet another crime, this one only 
involving the suggestion of sex between members of the same sex: 
Two gathered together under a single blanket, for example, naked 
and there is no divider between them, and it is not necessarily 
limited to that, are punished by discretion by a whip from 30 
                                                            
205.  KHU’I, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 189.  
206.  Islamic Penal Code of Iran (amended 2013), art. 235.  
207.  Jawahir, supra note 34, at 41:382; Khu’i, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 189.  
208.  Jawahir, supra note 34, at 41:383 (noting both opinions but preferring the one that 
indicates four occurrences merit death); KHU’I, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 190 (reciting a rule for 
death on the third occurrence). 
209.  Jawahir, supra note 34, at 41:402 (describing slander as “an accusation of 
fornication or liwat”); KHU’I, supra note 5, at ¶ 200 (same); Islamic Penal Code of Iran 
(amended 2013), art. 245.  
210.  See, e.g., KHU’I, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 99 (setting forth two witness requirement 
with the exceptions of liwat, lesbianism and fornication). This is not the position taken in 
Iranian law, however. Islamic Penal Code of Iran (amended 2013), art. 199.  
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lashes to 99 lashes. [It is reported that] “some asked Aba 
Abdullah [the third Imam] (peace be upon him) ‘what is the 
punishment for a man who sleeps with another man under a 
single covering?’ He said, ‘was there a divider’, and they said 
‘no’, and he said, ‘was it out of necessity?’ and they said ‘no’, so 
he said, ‘they are whipped thirty times.’211  
Under the Jawahir, four such occurrences result in the death 
penalty.212 Grand Ayatollah Khu’i, for his part, makes no mention of 
the death penalty for this crime, though after discussing the various 
opinions, he sets out a stricter rule of ninety nine lashes for each 
offense, rather than any sort of discretion on the number of lashes to 
impose.213 
In any event, it should be obvious that as a criminal matter, 
homosexuality is policed much more stringently than fornication. 
There is no mandatory crime concerning “thighing” for anyone but 
gays, let alone a mandatory crime for a man and woman lying naked 
under a blanket without any thighing. Such heterosexual 
licentiousness is dealt with by declaring fornication to be a serious 
sin, describing the rather horrific punishment for it explicitly, and 
then relying on strict Rules of Gazing to limit contact. This 
encourages use of the nikah to relieve sexual frustration, rather than 
licentious conduct that would lead believers away from a God 
centered universe. 
Where homosexuality is different is that it not only presents a 
greater threat to the highly gendered order that Shi’ism demands in its 
regulation of sex, but that it is much harder to take precautions to 
prevent given that one cannot exactly segregate a person from his or 
her own sex. Accordingly, additional crimes exist, ones that are much 
easier to police than any that are mandated for fornication.  
3. Lesbianism 
Just as Shi’ism found it necessary to prohibit same-sex male 
relationships in strident terms for the reasons already discussed, so it 
found equal reason to ban same sex female relationships. This renders 
Shi’ism quite distinct from the Sunni schools, where lesbianism was 
not a matter of juristic focus at all, let alone a mandatory, scriptural 
                                                            
211.  Jawahir, supra note 34, at 41:384.  
212.  Id. 
213.  KHU’I, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 191.   
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crime.214 The name of the crime is sihq. The Jawahir explains as 
follows: 
The crime of lesbianism is sexual intercourse between a woman 
and another, called in the sources, the women with the women. 
God and the angels have cursed it, along with those who remain 
in the loins of men and the uteruses of women [i.e. the unborn]. 
The [women] are in hell, and upon them are seventy vestments 
on fire, and above those vestments is a thick dry skin of fire. 
They wear a belt of fire and a crown of fire above their vestments 
and slippers of fire. It is the greatest fornication which occurs 
among people. Laqis, the daughter of Satan, together with what 
her father did with liwat among men, caused men to be satisfied 
with men, and women to be satisfied with women. What shall 
befall the [women] on Judgment Day—they shall wear rags of 
fire, veils of fire, vestments of fire, and what shall enter their 
bellies to their heads are pillars of fire, and they shall be thrown 
into the fire. . . . 215 
Interestingly enough, though the Jawahir describes lesbianism in 
the passage above as the “greatest fornication,” it imposes a lighter 
punishment than ordinary fornication. Specifically, reviewing 
ambiguous source material, the Jawahir suggests that the proper 
punishment is one hundred lashes, with death imposed on the fourth 
offense.216 More recent authorities are stricter. Grand Ayatollah 
Khu’i, for example, treats lesbianism the same as fornication, 
imposing one hundred lashes for the non-muhsan, and stoning for the 
muhsan, with the death penalty for the third offense.217 Grand 
                                                            
214.  Ali notes the following respecting Sunni classical authorities:  
Although literary, and to a lesser extent, legal texts include some discussion of 
sexual acts between women . . . most discussion of homoerotic acts focuses on 
male/male sexual activity. Several factors contribute to the silence regarding female 
same-sex activity. Perhaps the most important is that many legal effects depend on 
penetration of a penis. 
ALI, supra note 16, at 80; see also TUCKER, supra note 15, at 190. Plainly there is significant 
legal effect within Shi’ism arising from penetration of a penis, including the important legal 
distinction between liwat on the one hand, and “thighing” on the other, described in Section 
III.B.1. However, as the crime of thighing demonstrates, Shi’i jurists were hardly reticent to 
identify and castigate particular sexual activity as necessarily criminal even if it did not 
involve penis penetration. 
215.  Jawahir, supra note 34, at 41:387. 
216.  Id. at 41:388-390. 
217.  KHU’I, supra note 5, at 3 ¶¶ 194-195 (noting that the majority of jurists hold a 
different view, and rejecting that view).   
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Ayatollah Sistani suggests the same.218 As with same-sex male 
relations, the trend appears to be moving in the direction of increased 
strictness.  
Lesbianism is in some ways easier to prosecute than either liwat 
or fornication. It is true that four male witnesses are required, and the 
testimony of women carries no weight, unlike fornication.219 That 
said, as with “thighing,” there is obviously no penetration that must 
be witnessed. Moreover, perhaps more significantly, the crime of 
unfounded accusation does not apply against witnesses if an 
insufficient number of them testify, as it does with liwat and 
fornication.220 This thus frees witnesses to testify against women 
without fear of a mandatory lashing against them if an insufficient 
number of witnesses appear. If this were not a sufficient deterrent, 
then as with men, a punishment is imposed against women who are 
naked under a blanket together without some sort of barrier between 
them. The punishment, again as with men, is between thirty and 
ninety nine lashes according to the Jawahir, and ninety nine lashes, 
according to Khu’i.221 Unlike the case with men, however, the 
punishment is not raised to death with repeat offenses.222 
IV. THE REJECTION OF ALTERNATIVE PARADIGMS—ON 
GENDER CHANGE AND SEX WITH CHILDREN 
The previous sections have demonstrated the manner in which 
the regulation of sex in Shi’i Islam is designed, first, to permit human 
beings (though mostly men) an outlet for what is perceived to be an 
irresistible demand for sex, second, to satisfy that demand in a 
manner that keeps the believers focus fundamentally God-centered, 
and third, to ensure that this is done in a manner that preserves 
                                                            
218.  SISTANI, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 380 (imposing stoning on a married woman who 
engages in lesbian sex with her husband’s slave). It should be noted, however, that the Iranian 
Penal Code adopts a comparatively more lenient position, imposing one hundred lashes for 
each act of lesbianism with no mention of a possible death penalty. Islamic Penal Code of 
Islamic Republic of Iran (amended 2013), art. 127-29. 
219.  KHU’I, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 99; Jawahir, supra note 34, at 41:390-391. 
220.  Jawahir, supra note 34, at 41:402 (describing slander as “an accusation of 
fornication or liwat); KHU’I, supra note 5, at ¶ 200 (same). 
221.  Compare Jawahir, supra note 34 at 41:391 with KHU’I, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 191. 
222.  Jawahir, supra note 34, at 41:393-394 (considering the position that repeated 
offenses merit death and rejecting it out of “a precaution against trespassing on blood,” 
meaning that there is sufficient doubt as to the merit of killing those naked under a blanket 
together, if women, that to kill them might very well result in an unjustified killing and 
therefore should be avoided).   
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elaborately constructed gender hierarchies established in the forms of 
permissible sex known as the nikah.  
The purpose of this section is to demonstrate the manner in 
which alternative considerations that might play a more central role in 
other legal and normative systems are in fact of ancillary importance 
at best within the Shi’i paradigm. In so doing, I hope to demonstrate 
the fundamental distinctions between Shi’i Islam and these more 
familiar systems.  
A. Procreation, Sex and the Rights of the Transgendered 
1. On the Ancillary Role of Procreation in Sex Regulation 
One potential form of sex regulation rests squarely on the idea of 
sex being solely for the purpose of procreation. It is not difficult to 
add to this the limiting conviction that women serve best as mothers, 
who care for the children and raise them, and men serve best as 
breadwinners, who provide for the household. Under this normative 
system, premarital sex would be forbidden because of the possibility 
of procreation without the stability that marriage affords, and same-
sex marriage would be prohibited for the same reason. In addition, as 
a matter of logic, same-sex marriage would be inherently 
destabilizing under this approach, precisely because of the severe 
gender stereotyping involved in this sort of sex regulation. No child 
raised without a man and a woman could possibly be raised properly, 
almost by necessity. The child would either be lacking an adequate 
breadwinner, or an adequate caretaker with deep maternal instincts. 
One does not need to look very far in United States case law to find 
ample evidence of “family responsibilities discrimination” which is 
premised precisely upon such beliefs. 223   
                                                            
223. Williams and Bornstein open their article on family responsibilities discrimination 
with a series of examples in which men and women alike suffer due to these presumptions on 
the part of their employers. These include a woman fired so that she could spend more time 
with her children, and a man denied paternity leave because, in his supervisor’s words, “God 
made women to have babies.” Joan C. Williams & Stephanie Bornstein, The Evolution of 
“Fred”: Family Responsibilities Discrimination and Developments in the Law of Stereotyping 
and Implicit Bias, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1311 (2007-08). For an example of the salience of some 
of these ideas in contemporary American society as concerns opposition to same sex marriage, 
see Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 2-3, DeLeon et al. v. Perry, No. 5:13-cv-982 (5th Cir. 
July 28, 2014), which reads as follows: 
Texas marriage laws are rooted in a basic reality of human life. Two people of the 
same sex cannot, by themselves, procreate. . . . The State’s recognition and 
encouragement of opposite sex marriages increases the likelihood that naturally 
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The approach has long had its advocates in the Muslim world 
and elsewhere.224 Indeed, variations of this position that the purpose 
of sex is procreation are so common that scholars advancing the cause 
of gender equality in the specifically American context often connect 
in a rather intimate fashion access to reproductive rights on the one 
hand to the women’s struggle for equal rights more broadly on the 
other. MacKinnon thus indicates that “[r]eproductive control is 
properly ‘an integral part of modern woman’s struggle to assert her 
dignity and worth as a human being.’ In other words, it is a sex 
equality issue.”225 Siegel also describes a “sex equality” approach to 
reproductive rights, which, she indicates, “views the social 
organization of reproduction as playing a key role in determining 
women’s status and welfare.”226  
There may well be cause to engage in this sort of conflation in 
the United States, given the traditional associations of sex regulation 
and procreation. However, such views receive broad international 
recognition as well. USAID describes its support for international 
family planning efforts as bringing forth the benefit of improved 
women’s rights. 227 The United Nations Population Fund puts it even 
                                                                                                                                     
procreative couples will produce children, and they will do so in the context of 
stable, lasting relationships. By encouraging the formation of opposite sex 
marriages, the State seeks not only to encourage procreation but also to minimize 
the societal costs that can result from procreation outside of stable, lasting 
marriages. 
224.  Consider, for example, the stridently Islamist and militantly anti Western Sayyid 
Qutb, who says this to justify the rule that the testimony of two women is equivalent to that of 
one man: 
[T]he explanation is . . . clear. By the nature of her family duties the growth of a 
woman’s spirit is towards emotions and sentiments; just as in man it is towards 
contemplation and thought. . . . So when she is forgetful or when she is carried away 
by her feelings, the other is there to remind her. 
Interestingly, while Qutb relies on the existence of maternal duties to justify a rule he 
considers divinely imposed, he nowhere justifies the imposition of those self-same maternal 
duties in the first place, nor does he seem to recognize how fundamentally colonial they are in 
origin. See also ALI, supra note 16, at 6 (“Modern Muslim authors, both clerics and laypeople, 
glorify female domesticity and maternal virtue. The family unit they idealize, with mother-
housewife at its center, differs sharply from early jurists’ visions of the normative family. 
Domestic duties of child rearing and housewifery serve as the rationale for support by the male 
husband-father-breadwinner.”). 
225.  Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 
1281, 1328 (1991). 
226.  Reva B. Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments for Reproductive Rights: Their Critical 
Basis and Evolving Constitutional Expression, 56 EMORY L.J. 815 (2007). 
227.  See, e.g., Family Planning and Reproductive Health, USAID, (Sept. 29, 2015), 
https://www.usaid.gov/what-we-do/global-health/family-planning (“Increasing access to 
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more starkly, describing family planning as “central to gender 
equality and women’s empowerment.” 228 
The idea that the effort to provide reproductive rights is at heart 
and in all global contexts a fight for women’s equality is almost 
surely more limiting than many seem to believe. If Shi’i Islam’s rules 
on sex prove anything, it is that gender hierarchies that involve 
women’s subjugation are not at all difficult to achieve even in the 
absence of any sort of assumptions respecting a woman’s role as 
housewife and mother.  
One need to look no further than the elaborate rules set forth by 
none other than Grand Ayatollah Sistani specifically concerning birth 
control to see how this is so.229 Sistani prohibits certain methods of 
birth control, such as those that might cause harm to the wife,230 
anything that would “deny any part of the husband’s religious rights,” 
which presumably includes any method, such as condom use, that 
limits his right to sexual enjoyment in any way231 and any method that 
would require a doctor (male or female) to examine a woman’s 
genitalia because it would violate the Rules of Gazing already 
discussed.232 What is not forbidden, however, is using birth control 
without a husband’s permission.233 A wife’s unwillingness to bear 
children for her husband is, it turns out, none of his business.234 
Withdrawal by a husband without a wife’s consent is similarly 
disfavored, but not forbidden.235 Saeed al-Hakim goes so far as to 
                                                                                                                                     
reproductive health services, including voluntary family planning, has profound health, 
economic and social benefits for families and communities, such as . . . Supporting women’s 
rights and opportunities for education, employment and full participation in society”) 
(emphasis in original). 
228.  Family Planning, UNFPA, http://www.unfpa.org/family-planning#sthash.Au3EhRr
T.dpuf (last visited Oct. 1, 2015). 
229.  See generally ALI SISTANI, MASA’IL MUNTAKHIBA (2001) 534-36 [hereinafter 
MASA’IL]. 
230.  Id. at 534. 
231.  Id. 
232.  Id. (noting exception in cases of medical necessity).   
233.  Id.  
234.  Grand Ayatollah Saeed al-Hakim, a less prominent contemporary jurist relative to 
Sistani, takes a different approach. He indicates that any method of birth control that limits a 
husband’s right to enjoyment is absolutely forbidden, while one that does not is forbidden 
without a husband’s consent as a matter of precaution. SAEED AL-HAKIM, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 
48. Even this more conservative approach, however, demonstrates the priority of sexual 
enjoyment over procreation. 
235.  SISTANI, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 10. 
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indicate that the disfavoring is weaker if the wife has a “long and 
clamorous tongue” or uses “foul and base words.”236 
Even the most central role ascribed to mothers in Western 
tradition, that of the nursing of children, is extremely limited in 
juristic accounts. The following is a passage from the juristic 
compendium of Grand Ayatollah Sistani: 
A woman is not obligated to nurse her child, neither for free, nor 
for a fee, if her custody has not ceased. She is also not obligated 
to nurse the child for free if her custody has ceased, but she may 
demand a fee for nursing for two years, but not more, from the 
wealth of the child if the child has wealth, or from the father if 
the child does not have wealth, and the father is wealthy. If the 
child does not have wealth, and the father is not wealthy or is 
deceased, and so is the grandfather and other ascendants, then she 
must nurse the child for free, either on her own or through hiring 
a wet nurse, with the fee for her account based on the obligation 
to support the child, by precaution . . .237 
Similar rules exist in Grand Ayatollah Khu’i’s compendium.238 
Thus, a mother’s obligation to nurse the child exists only when (i) the 
child is not in her custody, and (ii) either she is paid for the nursing or 
there is no money to pay her from the estates of the child, the child’s 
father or any male ascendants, respectively. In all other 
circumstances, there is no obligation on her. In particular, Sistani 
makes clear later that if she remains married to her husband, she has 
the right, but not the obligation, to nurse the child.239 If she refuses to 
do it, or demands a fee for it, her husband has the right to find a wet 
nurse for a lesser fee, at which point the mother can accede to the wet 
nurse, or agree to nurse the child for free.  
Along the same lines, Shi’i authorities nowhere impose a duty 
on a wife to take care of the home, or perform any household tasks, 
whether it be cooking, cleaning, laundry, sewing, or even that most 
important task necessary to run a household in a rural community—
drawing water from a well. Most jurists do not mention any of these 
matters at all. The contemporary Grand Ayatollah Sistani does, but he 
only describes them as “recommended” for a woman to do.240 Quite 
                                                            
236.  SAEED AL HAKIM, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 46. 
237.  Id. at 3 ¶ 396. 
238.  See KHU’I, supra note 5, at 2 ¶ 1386. 
239.  SISTANI, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 397; see also KHU’I, supra note 5, at 2 ¶¶ 1386-1387 
(describing breast feeding as a right, but not an obligation, for a free woman). 
240.  SISTANI, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 340. 
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plainly, this is not an ethical system that seeks to emulate the 
matronly virtues of the ideal Victorian woman.  
This is not to say that procreation plays no role at all in the 
regulation of sex. Grand Ayatollah Hakim points out, for example, 
that marriage is recommended for all, even those whose sexual 
impulses are not necessarily as strong.241 This is because it has 
benefits other than sexual enjoyment, including procreation.242 While 
emphasizing the central importance of marriage to relieve sexual 
frustration, the Jawahir likewise indicates that the majority opinion 
still recommends it for those who do not have such intense sexual 
desires.243 The Jawahir also indicates that the purpose of the 
temporary marriage is enjoyment, while the permanent marriage has 
other purposes as well, such as children.244 Finally, as mentioned in 
Part II, the recommended invocation to God recited before sex 
involves a man asking for a pious and dutiful son, and then directing 
his wife to do the same.245  
Yet none of this derogates from the fundamental principle that in 
regulating sex, procreation is an ancillary consideration. The fact is 
that at the very moment that the man is asking for a dutiful son, his 
wife could be taking birth control, unbeknownst to him,246 and he 
could be planning on practicing withdrawal, unbeknownst to her.247 
Neither of these would be forbidden according to Grand Ayatollah 
Sistani.248 Hence, while procreation might be deemed a benefit 
deriving from sex, it is not a fundamental one, and certainly not one 
that is the basis of regulation of sex. 
It is probably important to mention in addition that the jurists 
were of course aware enough of the world to know that procreation 
was a frequent consequence of sex, and so they did develop an 
elaborate set of rules concerning the legitimation of progeny. Hence, 
for example, a permanent wife may not marry again after a 
termination of an existing marriage until three menstrual cycles have 
passed,249 while a temporary wife must wait two menstrual cycles.250 
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However, prepubescent girls, menopausal women and those whose 
marriages were not consummated have no similar waiting period.251 
Plainly, the rules ensure that women who can become pregnant do not 
have sex in a manner that would raise any question as to paternity.  
To further this goal, jurists have also laid out extensive rules 
establishing conclusive presumptions of paternity when a woman is 
married.252 Even in areas where there would be little need to think of 
the consequences of procreation, for example lesbian sex, passages 
appear that lay out rules for what to do if a wife has sex with her 
husband, then with a virgin woman, in a manner that impregnates the 
virgin with the semen of the husband. (According to both Sistani and 
Khu’i, the child is treated as the legitimate issue of the “master of the 
sperm” (i.e. the husband) and the virgin, the wife is stoned, and the 
virgin is paid a mahr from the wife. After the virgin gives birth, she is 
lashed).253 
However, these rules of legitimation arise only to address the 
possibility of progeny arising out of sex. They are not the reason that 
sex is regulated in the first place, except incidentally. It cannot be 
seriously contended that fornication and homosexuality are prohibited 
because of some Victorian era notion that it might lead to a child 
being raised in a home without a father and mother. The rules simply 
do not support this proposition.  
2. On the Hermaphrodite in Shi’i Juristic Thought 
The marginal role that procreation plays in the regulation of sex 
in Shi’i Islam offers significant possibilities for the transgendered that 
might not otherwise exist. That is, if the purpose of marriage is not to 
build families with a housewife as a mother and a breadwinner as a 
father, but to render sex licit within a gender defined contract known 
as the nikah, then the idea that a couple cannot procreate naturally 
presents no obstacle to their marriage. The only important matter is 
that the contract includes a man and a woman, each with clearly 
established and predefined obligations and expectations. That the 
woman used to be a man, or the man used to be a woman, is not in 
and of itself problematic.  
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In fact, related matters have been a source of juristic discussion 
for centuries. To quote Kecia Ali in the context of Sunni Islam, and as 
is no less true of Shi’i Islam: 
The acknowledgment of the existence of transsexuals is not more 
of a challenge to the standard jurisprudential discourse of 
sex/gender than that of the hermaphrodite in classical and 
medieval discourses, nor is a person of ambiguous sex a 
challenge to the binary system once properly categorized.254 
Ali’s point respecting the hermaphrodite is an important one. 
Islamic law across schools and sects has long given a great deal of 
thought to the question of how to deal with those who did not fall 
neatly into either category of male or female because they had 
biological characteristics of both sexes, known in Islamic discourse as 
the khuntha.255  
In such a highly gendered normative system, there is some sense 
to the attention given to the subject despite the relative infrequency of 
sex ambiguity as a biological matter. The questions raised, after all, 
are manifold. For example, the Rules of Gazing limit interactions 
between men and women who are unrelated, as Part III.A shows. 
How do these rules apply to the khuntha? Women generally inherit 
half of what a similarly situated man does in Islam’s mandatory 
inheritance system, meaning that if a decedent leaves a son and a 
daughter, the son’s portion would be twice that of his sister.256 If one 
assumes that a couple has two children, one of whom is a son, and the 
other of whom is a khuntha, how would the estate be distributed? 
Perhaps most vexing of all, is it permissible for the khuntha to marry, 
and, if so, to a person of which sex? 
The manner in which the jurists tried to address this was to 
categorize people of ambiguous sex into either a man or a woman. In 
fact, the operating presumption was that such a person was either a 
man or a woman, and the human task was to determine which one 
given the conflicting signs. Hence, the Jawahir defines the khuntha as 
“one who is male or female in reality, without a means to identify 
clearly [which] within the division of people, and indeed all animals, 
into male and female. This is how they are always characterized in the 
Book and the Tradition [of the Prophet] in a manner that cannot be 
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denied.”257 Following this, the text refers to the khuntha as having the 
genitalia of both sexes.258 
The jurists performed the necessary categorization by focusing 
primarily on the urinary tract. Specifically, if a person urinated from a 
penis, then the person was male, and if they urinated from female 
genitalia, then the person was female.259 If they urinated from both, 
then the genitals from which the person originally urinated controlled 
the sex attributed to the person.260 Other tests arise if the person 
urinated from both originally. These include the location of the later 
urination,261 to, upon reaching puberty, the onset of menstruation, the 
presence of wet dreams, or the appearance of breasts, though in some 
cases these latter tests are described as problematic.262 The details 
need not be recounted here.  
However many tests are used, there is always the possibility that 
no gender can be ascribed to the khuntha, in which case the khuntha is 
referred to as khuntha mushakkal, or a mixed khuntha.263 Various 
rules are developed throughout the juristic texts to deal with these 
individuals. In inheritance, for example, they receive half of the 
portion that a male would, and half of the portion that a female 
would.264 The khuntha mushakkal cannot lead prayers, just as women 
cannot, though if they do so without the knowledge of those 
following, then the prayer need not be repeated.265  
However, it is precisely in the area of sex regulation that the 
questions become the source of greatest juristic anxiety. Hence, where 
in inheritance the jurists used the sex ambiguity to grant the khuntha 
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half of what a man would receive and half of what a woman would 
receive, they operated at far higher levels of precaution as concerned 
the Rules of Gazing. Ever concerned about the possibility of illicit sex 
of either the homosexual or heterosexual variety, the jurists took the 
extraordinary step of obligating the segregation of the khuntha from 
both genders. Specifically, to quote Hakim, as concerns the Rules of 
Gazing, “the khuntha is as a man to a woman, and as a woman to a 
man.”266 Hence, a khuntha need not cover in front of other women, 
because deemed a man in such circumstances.267 However, the 
prohibition against gazing at other women would apply, as would the 
obligation to cover as a woman in the presence of men.268 
As concerns sex and the nikah, the rules are no less burdensome 
among modern jurists. The mid nineteenth century Jawahir contains a 
remarkable passage that, in a fashion characteristic of Shi’i jurists, 
obliquely criticizes the determinations of Sheikh Tusi, one of 
Shi’ism’s great early clerics who made enormous contributions to 
Shi’i jurisprudential thought:269 
The Sheikh said in his Mabsut, “if the khuntha are a husband or a 
wife,” based on what is said in some reports, “they take half of 
the inheritance of the husband, and half of the inheritance of the 
wife.” The basis for this is what we have recited respecting the 
possibility of being father or mother. But it is known that the 
marriage of the mixed khuntha is not permitted, on the basis of 
the prohibition of sex. 
And if there is permissibility, then it comes with doubt. This is 
because if a khuntha undertakes a nikah with a khuntha, and we 
declared the contract between them valid, then they died 
simultaneously, before their estates were distributed, then we 
would not know which is the husband, and which is the wife. 
With the rule that we give half of the attributed portions of each, 
then as for the relatives whose inheritance we must distribute, the 
reality is that they will not give up their portions. And here it is 
possible that they were two men or two women, so there is no 
marriage and therefore no inheritance. And if there is a child 
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between them, then we do not know which of them gave birth, 
and if we do know, it is only through hearsay. 
What al-Qadhi has said is “if a khuntha marries a khuntha, it is 
dependent on one being a man and the other being a woman. 
Before their status is clarified, the marriage is suspended until it 
is known, and if one dies before it is known, they do not inherit. 
I said, it is like this, because the marriage may be unsound due to 
their being both men or both women. What I read from the 
Mabsut does not differ after these two possibilities are refuted by 
the existence of a child between them. Perhaps what the Sheikh 
intended was that the khuntha if married to a wife known to be a 
woman, or a wife to a husband similarly known to be a man, then 
based on the soundness of that, or on the assumption that it might 
be sound, then in the first case [he] deserves an inheritance 
portion that is half of the inheritance of a husband. In the second 
case, half of the inheritance portion of a wife. This is because of 
the possibility of masculinity in the first case, and femininity in 
the second, in which case she deserves [an inheritance portion] 
and the possibility of the opposite, in which case she deserves 
nothing. So [the Sheikh] considered the two possibilities and 
gave inheritance taking both into account, which is half. It is 
similar as to property that is in doubt between two people and 
each of them claims it is his, so it is divided in half. And God 
knows best.270 
Sheikh Tusi, in other words, appeared merely to extend the very 
same rules respecting inheritance that apply in other circumstances as 
concern the khuntha to a husband and wife who were both khuntha. In 
other words, where a son of a decedent inherits half of what a 
daughter does, then the well established rule is that a khuntha will 
inherit half of a son’s portion and half of a daughter’s.271 This would 
mean an estate would be divided among a son, a khuntha and a 
daughter (assuming no other heirs) in a 4:3:2 ratio. Tusi merely 
adopted the same idea as concerned the married khuntha. 
In the Jawahir, however, this is deemed problematic, because a 
husband and a wife are not as a son and a daughter. Specifically, they 
have sex with each other. And it is not clear if their sex is being 
validly undertaken in the context of a nikah, or if it is not, and is 
therefore homosexuality of some sort, undertaken illicitly. Even the 
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existence of a child does not avoid this problem, the Jawahir notes, 
because while then there is a suggestion of opposite gender, nobody 
knows which of the two has the obligations of a husband, and which 
the obligations of a wife. The gender differentiation so painstakingly 
developed in the nikah is therefore put into jeopardy. To the Jawahir, 
this is intolerable, and no such marriage can be recognized.  
Thus, to the modern jurists, ambiguity as to sex is extremely 
troublesome and anxiety inducing, and must be reduced as much as 
possible. It is perhaps for this reason that Grand Ayatollah Sistani has 
taken the position that the evidentiary rules respecting the 
determination of sex are subject to change on the basis of scientific 
advancement. That is, Sistani notes that if one is unsure as to sex, then 
the first method to ascertain it is by virtue of “recent scientific 
means.”272 It is only where science is indeterminate that the urinary 
tract test described earlier becomes relevant.273 In contrast, the Grand 
Ayatollah does not rely on science as concerns the determination of 
paternity, where the traditional juristic rules hold and where no 
mention is made, at all, of the possibility of DNA testing.274   
Plainly, different standards are being used to address different 
circumstances. As concerns the legitimacy of children, the goal is less 
about achieving technical and scientific accuracy in attributing 
paternity then it is in avoiding the types of instability that would 
surely be generated by uncertainties concerning legitimacy and 
accusations of the serious sin of fornication. By contrast, with the 
khuntha, the preexisting presumption is that there is, somehow, a 
“true” sex to which the person belongs, and the goal is to find it, and 
then apply it. To the extent science can help make that determination, 
this is all to the better.  
3. On the Rights of Transsexuals 
The previous section lays out the theoretical framework that 
contemporary jurists use to address matters of ambiguous sex. This 
section demonstrates the manner in which they have come to quite 
different results concerning the application of this framework to the 
matter of sex change operations. For purposes of simplicity and 
clarity, I focus on two premier jurists of the past fifty years who have 
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had tremendous influence on modern Shi’i thought. These are Grand 
Ayatollah Sistani, the jurist widely regarded as the most learned 
operating out of Najaf, and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the leader 
of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. 
Both jurists are of the view that if science can determine that a 
person clearly belongs to a particular sex, then there is no problem 
that arises as to an operation whose function is to make that sex more 
manifest.275 Khu’i takes this position as well,276 and it is perhaps not 
surprising. This is not really a “sex change” in the minds of the 
jurists, but rather an operation that makes a person’s “true” sex 
clearer, a logical extension of the treatment of the khuntha described 
in the previous part to a world of scientific advancement. In this 
sense, it is no more controversial than surgery to cure a hearing 
impairment would be. Khomeini explains that such surgery is not 
obligatory.277 Sistani, by failing to mention anything concerning an 
obligation on a believer, seems to agree.278 Again this is not terribly 
controversial, as one is also not obligated to undergo surgery to 
address hearing impairments either.  
There are exceptions to this idea of voluntariness that arise from 
the fact that, as Khomeini notes, a person who is scientifically a 
woman has all of the obligations of a woman imposed upon her, and a 
person who is scientifically a man has all of the obligations of men 
imposed upon him.279 Thus, if a person cannot carry out their own 
obligations without a “sex clarifying” operation, or if there is some 
sort of fear that if they do not undertake the operation, they will fall 
into sin, then the surgery is mandatory.280 Though Khomeini does not 
elaborate, the first situation might include an inability on the part of a 
person who is scientifically determined to be a man to pray a 
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mandatory communal prayer because he has breasts that make him 
appear as a woman, and the second situation might refer to one 
scientifically determined to be a woman tempted to remove her 
headscarf because she appears as a man and can therefore do so 
without repercussion.281  
The more interesting question, and the one on which the jurists 
are divided, concerns a voluntary sex change operation for one whose 
biological characteristics are entirely one sex or the other. 
Remarkably, neither jurist indicates that such a change is inherently 
prohibited.282 The problem, instead, is one that Kecia Ali discusses in 
the Sunni tradition as concerned a famous case of sex change in Egypt 
that was undertaken decades ago. Specifically, Ali notes, opponents 
of the sex change maintained that no change had actually occurred, 
only “mutilation” of a human body.283 This very much seems to be 
Sistani’s opinion of what a sex change operation is. To quote him: 
If what is meant by sex change of a man to a woman is a surgical 
operation to sever the penis and the testicles, and to place two 
openings, one for the urinal pathway, and the other for the 
practice of sex, and the giving of the person doses of feminine 
hormones which affect his outward appearance and give a 
feminine look, in the rise of breasts and the lack of beard hair, 
and the like, and 
If what is meant by the change of a woman to a man is that an 
artificial penis is put on her and dosages of masculine hormones 
given to appear as a man, without the rise of breasts and [the 
establishment of] beard hair, and the like, 
Then all of this does not affect or change a man to a woman at 
all, nor a woman to a man. . . .  
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However, if what is meant is that change of a man to a woman, or 
the opposite, as concerns the internal and external organs of 
reproduction which are the point of distinction between one sex 
and the other, then there is no objection to this by itself . . . , but 
what is apparent is that this is not done in our times, and what is 
done is the first of these.284  
In some sense, it is true that Sistani is entertaining only a 
theoretical distinction in describing the two possibilities, and 
permitting one while prohibiting the other.285 Nevertheless, the 
distinction is interesting, and revealing of Sistani’s worldview. He is 
undisturbed by the theoretical possibility of a person moving from 
one sex to another in Shi’i Islam’s deeply entrenched binary gender 
system. He is deeply disturbed by a person willing to mutilate 
themselves so that they can engage in prohibited homosexuality. 
Hence, he prohibits the sex change unless it somehow can change all 
internal and external features of a person’s sex from one to the other 
in an absolute fashion. 
For his part, Khomeini’s views on homosexuality are no less 
forgiving than those of the other modern Shi’i jurists already 
discussed. Anal male to male sex is still punished with death, 
beheading, being thrown from a tall building, having a wall toppled 
on the offender, burning or stoning.286 Lesbianism is still punished 
with one hundred lashes, and death on the fourth offense.287 Yet 
Khomeini’s attitude towards sex change is quite different. He seems 
unperturbed by the fact that there has been no complete biological 
overhaul of the sort demanded by Sistani. What Sistani views as 
mutilation, Khomeini views as an unambiguous change that he is 
willing to countenance, no different than the clarification of sex for 
one of the khuntha, even if the original sex of the person was clear. 
Specifically, he indicates: 
What is clear is that the change of sex from a man to a woman, or 
the reverse, through an operation, is not prohibited, nor is the 
operation for a khuntha prohibited so that he is attached to one of 
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the two sexes. But is it obligatory on a woman who sees in 
herself tendencies that are in essence those of a man, or some 
masculine qualities, or a man sees in himself the tendencies or 
qualities of the opposite sex? What is clear is that it is not 
required if the person is truly of one sex, but he may change his 
sex to the opposite.288 
A man with feminine tendencies, in other words, may remain a 
man if he wishes, and, in so doing, continue to have the obligations 
and duties of a man, including not gazing upon women he does not 
know, supporting his spouse, and, of course, not engaging in any 
sexual contact of any sort with other men. He may also undertake an 
operation to change to a woman if he wishes, at which point she will 
have the obligations and duties of a woman, including covering her 
body from the eyes of men, enabling her husband to have sex with her 
at any time of his choosing, and not engaging in any sexual contact of 
any sort with other women. The same applies in reverse. All of this, to 
Ayatollah Khomeini, is tolerable, as it presents no threat to the 
gendered order, but merely changes the rules to which any given 
individual is subject. 
The remainder of Khomeini’s rules deal with the implications of 
this permissibility given the binary system. Obviously, the previous 
marriage of any person who changes sex is thereby invalid, lest sex 
change be a means to practice homosexuality.289 This creates 
implications as to the dower. Khomeini requires its return if the wife 
changes her gender and requires any deferred and unpaid dower paid 
in full if it is the husband who changes.290 Similarly, there are 
inheritance implications. Does a transsexual upon the death of a child 
inherit as a father, which she was when the child was born, or as a 
mother, which she is at the time of death? Khomeini indicates the 
inheritance is as a father.291 A man may not marry his daughter in law, 
but if a woman changes her gender, may she marry her daughter’s 
husband? Khomeini indicates no.292 Other, more remote issues are 
raised, such as how to treat the marriage of a couple who undergo 
simultaneous sex change operations.293  
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At one level, the disquisitions into such highly improbable 
scenarios as a husband and wife who both change their sex, or a 
mother who changes her sex and then wants to marry a daughter in 
law, seem odd, and almost amusing. To Khomeini, however, these 
matters are deadly serious. As with some of the questions concerning 
the khuntha, no matter how esoteric, they must be resolved if the 
gender differentiation and gender hierarchy Shi’i Islam has long 
depended upon in its regulation of sex is to be maintained. The 
system, in many ways, depends on their satisfactory resolution. 
Later Iranian jurists appear to continue to endorse Khomeini’s 
position, though they do so while revealing some of the disquiet 
concerning the possibility, raised by Sistani, that the sex change is 
being used as a vehicle to practice the abominable sin of 
homosexuality.294 Hence, for example, the late Grand Ayatollah 
Montazeri indicated that sex change operations are permissible so 
long as they are not for a “corrupt purpose.”295 Iran’s current Supreme 
Leader, Ali Khamenei, indicates that sex change is permissible if it 
does not lead to a “forbidden or vile” act. In practice, the distinction 
between a person who genuinely wants to change sex and one who 
actually wants to remain one sex but is using the cover of sex change 
to engage in homosexuality is a nearly impossible one to police. It is 
perhaps for this reason that Iran has become, according to major 
media outlets, the “sex change capital of the world”.296 That this is the 
same place that imposes severe punishments for homosexuals may 
come as a surprise to some readers, but in fact is entirely consonant 
with the traditional Shi’i normative system endorsed by modern 
jurists. Quite simply, homosexuality threatens the gender hierarchies 
in a manner that transsexualism does not. 
B. Sex and Children in Shi’i Islam and Liberal Society 
In my description of the manner in which sex is regulated within 
the normative framework constructed by modern Shi’i jurists, Shi’i 
Islam may appear punitive relative to advocates of the liberal society, 
demanding severe sanction for sexual activity that should be 
unproblematic. This may well be true in any number of respects, from 
fornication to homosexuality.  
                                                            
294. See ALI, supra note 16, at 94. 
295. Jafari, supra note 270, at 37-38. 
296. See, e.g., Robert Tait, A Fatwa for Freedom, The Guardian (U.K.), July 27, 2005.   
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At the same time, it would be a mistake to describe liberal 
society, even in some sort of ideal form, as not calling for the 
imposition of harsh punishments against offenders of the liberal 
sexual order. Specifically, given the centrality of individual autonomy 
to liberal thought, including very much autonomy over the body, 
nonconsensual sex is punished in severe terms. This includes both the 
actual act of sex without consent or sex trafficking of unwilling 
victims.297  
Shi’ism, by contrast, does not center its rules around individual 
autonomy and consent as concerns sex. In fact, there is not even a 
juristic term that could be reasonably translated as “rape.”298 There is 
“fornication by force” which a man can effect against a woman.299 
This functions as an excuse for the victim of the force, and enhances 
the punishment for fornication against the offender so that he is killed, 
whether or not married.300  
But this is illicit sex rendered worse through the application of 
force, with the woman not so much a victim of a violation of her 
autonomy deserving of compensation so much as deemed not guilty 
of any criminal act because she did not voluntarily commit any such 
act. The idea of lawful sex somehow becoming unlawful by virtue of 
a lack of consent is peripheral at best. Thus, the rules contained in the 
juristic compendia of Grand Ayatollahs from the Jawahir to Muhsen 
al-Hakim to Khu’i respecting sex with female slaves are complex and 
elaborate, but they do not include consent as a defining feature, if 
                                                            
297. David DeMatteo, Meghann Galloway, Shelby Arnold, Unnati Patel, Sexual Assault 
on College Campuses: A 50-State Survey of Criminal Sexual Assault Statutes and Their 
Relevance to Campus Sexual Assault, 21 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 227, 235 (2015) 
(surveying federal and state statutes addressing sexual assault and concluding they do not 
always work particularly well in the context of on campus sexual assault); Dina Francesca 
Haynes, (Not) Found Chained to A Bed in A Brothel: Conceptual, Legal, and Procedural 
Failures to Fulfill the Promise of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 
337, 341 (2007) (criticizing the manner in which the Trafficking Victims Protection Act 
focusses on the prosecution of offenders of sex trafficking at the expense of protecting 
victims). 
298. Modern Arabic has a term for rape, which is ightisab, taken from the root verb 
ghasaba, which is to usurp. HANS WEHR, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN WRITTEN ARABIC 790-
91 (Cowan, 4th ed. 1979). This is a reflection of the liberal notion that to rape a person is to 
engage in a “theft of the most intimate kind.” See Jennifer Ann Drobac, Sex and the 
Workplace: “Consenting” Adolescents and A Conflict of Laws, 79 WASH. L. REV. 471, 500 
(2004) (discussing sex with children). Ightisab is not, however, a term I have ever come across 
in thousands of hours reading juristic texts.  
299. KHU’I, supra note 5, at 3 ¶¶ 136, 153; Jawahir, supra note 34, at 41:265, 315. 
300. KHU’I, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 153; Jawahir, supra note 34, at 41:315.  
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such a thing were even possible in the context of a master-slave 
relationship.301   
That said, individual autonomy plays some role in regulating 
sexual relationships, but it is a limited one. Most obviously, an adult 
free woman must consent to a marriage in order for it to take place. 302 
This means, of course, that no person whom an adult free woman 
would absolutely refuse to engage in sexual intercourse with could 
have sex with her without committing a capital offense in the process. 
However, if she is a virgin, she needs the consent of her father or 
grandfather as well, thereby vitiating the notion that somehow it is her 
right to consent that alone validates her sex acts.303 Perhaps more 
importantly, once married, she has no right to refuse sex—indeed, her 
primary obligation is to enable it, and her refusal entitles her husband 
to exercise physical discipline against her.304  
Thus, the regulation of sex is not as fundamentally concerned in 
the Shi’i normative framework with liberal notions of individual 
autonomy and consent so much as it is with its three commitments 
laid out above of (i) widely available sex, (ii) designed to be God-
centered, and (iii) conducted exclusively within the confines of a 
gender hierarchy established by the rules of the nikah. It is only 
similar to liberalism in that it imposes severe punishments for 
violators, though the punishments contemplated by the jurists are 
more severe than those contemplated by liberals for those who break 
the rules.  
In any event, the significant conceptual discrepancies do not 
work themselves into significant practical ones in large numbers of 
instances. That is, whether or not one wishes to describe a man who 
forces sex on a woman not his wife as a rapist, or as a person who has 
fornicated by force, the result is the same—the woman is blameless, 
and the man has violated the rules of sex regulation in a core fashion 
that deserves severe punishment. Obviously, the same is not true of 
marital rape. However, the more interesting case to contrast is one 
that lies very much on the extreme end of sanctionable behavior in the 
                                                            
301. See Jawahir, supra note 34, at 30:204-317; KHU’I, supra note 5, at 3 ¶¶ 1320-1340 
URWA, supra note 5, at 14:179-196. One potential exception is the suggestion by Hakim that 
out of precaution, a man should avoid engaging in anal sex with a wife or female slave, in 
particular if the wife or female slave does not consent. URWA, supra note 5, at 14:61, 64. 
302. SISTANI, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 41; KHU’I, supra note 5, at 2 ¶ 1237. 
303. SISTANI, supra note 5, at 3 ¶ 67; KHU’I, supra note 5, at 2 ¶ 1237. 
304. See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text. 
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liberal scheme, and one viewed with relative equanimity in the Shi’i 
framework. This is sex with children. 
There is obviously a broad consensus in liberal society that sex, 
or any sort of lewd or lascivious conduct, that takes place with 
minors, and in particular young children, deserves severe punishment. 
The worst cases can end with what are effectively life sentences for 
the convicted.305 The US Congress requires all states as a condition of 
funding to adopt registries for sex offenders,306 and this is to say 
nothing of the burgeoning civil liability that arises out of cases 
involving the sexual assault of children not only against offenders, but 
also those who fail to take measures to protect minors from harm.307 
The reasons are obvious. Children lack the capacity to consent to 
sexual activity in the manner that adults do, and therefore, to have sex 
with a child is to rape the child.308 Moreover, the psychological and 
physical harm that attends to children upon such a rape is presumed to 
be quite severe given their immature state.309 Therefore, given the 
harm, and the assault on individual autonomy, sex with a child is a 
serious matter indeed.  
Shi’i Islam takes a different approach, consistent with its own 
focus respecting the purpose of sex regulation. My focus here is on 
that subject that most preoccupies modern Shi’i jurists, which is sex 
between an adult man and a young girl to whom he is married.310 It is 
worth noting as an initial matter that such a marriage is possible. A 
paternal father or grandfather has a right of guardianship that enables 
                                                            
305.  See, e.g., Ellen M. Bublick, Who Is Responsible for Child Sexual Abuse? A View 
from the Penn State Scandal, 17 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 297, 297 (2014) (describing 
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306.  Catherine L. Carpenter, Legislative Epidemics: A Cautionary Tale of Criminal 
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307.  Bublick, supra note 306, at 301. 
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informed consent because they lack capacity, the sexual taking of a child’s body constitutes a 
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309.  See Tanya Asim Cooper, Sacrificing the Child to Convict the Defendant: 
Secondary Traumatization of Child Witnesses by Prosecutors, Their Inherent Conflict of 
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244-47 (2011) (describing trauma suffered by children who are victims of violence, including 
sexual victimization). 
310.  See, e.g., Jawahir, supra note 34, at 29:414-419; URWA, supra note 5 at 14:78-82; 
SISTANI, supra note 5 at 3 ¶ 8; KHU’I, supra note 5, at 2 ¶ 1236. 
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him to marry his sons and daughters before they are adults.311 
Moreover, the age at which a girl becomes an adult is quite young—
specifically, nine lunar years of age, which is approximately eight 
years and nine months.312  
That Shi’i jurists allow child marriages is not in and of itself 
particularly surprising. If the foundation of sex is not the realization 
of any particular value of autonomy, but the establishment of gender 
hierarchies and the availability of plentiful God-centered sex within 
the context of the nikah, then the marriage of young girls is by itself 
unproblematic.  
Of course, given her marital rights, it is important that the 
guardian exercising the right to marry his daughter do so with her best 
interests in mind. This would mean that he marry her to a respectable 
person with means to support her, who offers her a sufficient mahr. 
Thus, Shi’i jurists condition the right of the father or paternal 
grandfather to the absence of a corrupt purpose, and, in some cases, 
the perception of a benefit.313 They further specifically disallow 
marriages that seem to be contracted with unsuitable husbands,314 and 
do not permit any man in the absence of a living father or paternal 
grandfather (or any other direct lineal male ascendant) to marry off a 
minor ward, out of fear that such a guardian would not be acting in 
the ward’s main interest.315 
Thus, it is not as if there are no interests to consider on the part 
of a young girl—it is merely that her right to exercise sexual 
autonomy over her own body is not one of them. Hence, if the 
husband is suitable, offers a mahr, has the means to support his wife, 
and merely happens to enjoy sex with nine-year-olds, no particular 
problem arises. In fact, some of the jurists go so far as to encourage 
marriages at such a young age, quoting two different Imams to the 
                                                            
311.  URWA, supra note 5 at 14:453-454; Jawahir, supra note 34, at 29:170-172; KHU’I, 
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effect that it adds to a man’s happiness that his daughter not 
menstruate in his home.316 
Modern jurists further describe as unproblematic sexual 
enjoyments with a child bride, including kissing, grasping with 
appetite, and even “thighing” (the same term as used to refer to the 
scriptural crime when two men engage in it).317 There is no minimum 
age for this, and Hakim goes so far as to indicate it is permissible 
even if the child is still nursing.318 Again, that some men enjoy sex 
with children is not a reason to deny it to them within this normative 
framework, so long as they engage in it in a God-centered fashion, 
avoid fornication, and make sure to fulfill their financial marital 
obligations to their wives in the process. In fact, there is some reason 
to permit it, precisely because otherwise men who enjoy sex with 
children might seek it outside of the confines of the nikah, and 
thereby engage in the highly impermissible act of fornication. 
There is one obvious problem with all of this that the jurists 
recognized, and this is that the penetration of a young girl could cause 
obvious physical harm to her. They did as a result try to take account 
of this. First, they declared penetration of a girl anally or vaginally to 
be impermissible prior to her reaching the age of nine, and there is no 
dispute among them on this point.319 The specific reason is the lack of 
a girl younger than this to handle such penetration.320 Given how 
generally permissive Shi’i Islam is as concerns sexual enjoyment of a 
wife within the nikah, the restriction is considerable. 
This leaves two obvious questions. First, precisely what happens 
to a husband who breaks this rule and penetrates his child bride before 
the age of nine? Second, is there any consequence if a husband causes 
his wife physical harm through penetration after the age of nine? 
As to the first, because the sole problem is not violation of 
autonomy, but rather the causing of physical harm, modern jurists 
have broadly read the ambiguous source text to conclude there is no 
                                                            
316. URWA supra note 5, at 14:11 (quoting Third Imam); SAEED AL-HAKIM, supra note 
5, at 3: ¶ 33 (quoting Sixth Imam and indicating further that to delay the marriage after 
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earthly consequence to the husband’s penetration if he does not cause 
severe harm.321 In so doing, they have rejected an alternative 
interpretation, described by Grand Ayatollah Hakim as “majority,” 
denying the husband the right to have sex with his wife again as a 
consequence of this sin.322  
It would be fair to point out that jurists such as Sistani indicate 
the sin remains even if no harm ensues.323 Thus, the rules seem to 
presume that there are believers who are willing to have sex with their 
wives while clothed, reciting the names of God, avoiding sex on 
boats, during eclipses and at the end of each month, all due to a series 
of rules that recommend some conduct and disfavor other conduct. 
Such believers are then not likely to engage in a form of sex that is 
not merely disfavored, but entirely prohibited. One less enamored of 
the rules, however—Holmes’ proverbial “bad man,” for example324—
might feel less constrained.  
In any event, there are legal consequences to a husband 
penetrating an underage wife if the penetration causes “ripping,” 
which means the combination of one of the urinal, anal or menstrual 
pathways with another one of them.325 In that case, the modern jurists 
take the position that, whether or not the man remains married to the 
girl, he must pay her what is known as blood money.326 In taking this 
position, the jurists reject alternative source text that would suggest 
that no such amounts are due so long as the marriage remains 
intact.327 Modern jurists are thus adopting positions subject to earlier 
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debate that both enable sexual enjoyment on the part of husbands, but 
also impose financial consequences on them for doing so.  
The concept of blood money arises in the case of the law of 
retaliation, whereby, upon an intentional injury inflicted by one 
person onto another, the victim (or his male relatives, if he dies) has 
the choice to inflict a retaliatory injury on the perpetrator or to receive 
blood money, but not both.328 Within “intentional” injury is some 
notion of extreme recklessness, such that a person who digs a well in 
a public road in a manner that would ordinarily kill a person who fell 
in would be deemed subject to retaliation whether the purpose was to 
kill someone or not.329 However, where the perpetrator inflicted the 
injury as a matter of ordinary recklessness or even mistake, then 
retaliation is not possible, and only blood money is due.330 By 
declaring blood money due, and making no reference to the 
possibility of retaliation, the jurists seem to view the injury as akin to 
a mistake, even if a culpable one, rather than some sort of extreme 
recklessness.331 
The amount the husband owes is the same amount that would be 
due to her relatives if he had killed her.332 There are various standards 
that can be used to measure this amount, but the most common would 
probably be five hundred gold dinars, equal to 2.25 kg of gold, or 
about US $75,000 in 2015.  
Other important consequences attach if the husband causes a 
ripping of his wife. Specifically, many of the legal effects of marriage 
would remain his for his life even if he chose to divorce her.333 Thus, 
he could not take four permanent wives in addition to her, she would 
be entitled to inherit as his wife, he could not marry her sister, and, 
perhaps most importantly of all to her, his obligation to support her 
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would remain for life, even if he divorced her and she married 
someone else.334  
As for sex with a girl nine lunar years or older, this constitutes 
no sin at all, because the girl is deemed an adult. Thus, if he causes 
the ripping referred to before, he need not pay blood money, as he has 
done no wrong, and only engaged in lawful sex. That said, the jurists 
plainly were aware that the harm done to the girl would effectively 
make it nearly impossible for her to remarry, and hence imposed upon 
him the same obligations as they did for the ripping of an underage 
girl, except for the blood money. Specifically, the legal effects of 
marriage, including support and a right to a portion of the inheritance, 
remain on the husband for life.335 
To be clear, these obligations are not insignificant, and it would 
be unfair to describe them as such. The blood money is quite large—
almost surely larger than any dower a husband would agree to pay 
except in the richest of families. Moreover, a lifelong support 
obligation means that the injured woman has some modicum of 
financial security that other women would lack, for no reason other 
than that the husbands of healthy women might divorce them and be 
free of all obligations to them after the waiting period.336 The jurists 
are thus not indifferent to physical injury that can occur to young girls 
if they have premature sex.  
What they do not seem to take into account is any other other 
harm arising from sex with minors that requires compensation, 
punishment or both. This is because there is no sense that the 
deprivation of autonomy over the body, among the greatest forms of 
deprivation imaginable in the liberal consciousness, and a key pillar 
around which much sex regulation is based in the liberal society, is in 
fact a recognizable harm that demands legal recognition. The key 
areas of concern are not ensuring autonomy and consent, but instead, 
preventing acts that will cause a breakdown of gender hierarchy, the 
seeking of sex outside of the bounds of the nikah, and excessive 
licentiousness due to the unquenchable desire for sex that would lead 
the believers away from a God-centered moral life. The fact is that 
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marital sex with children, unlike homosexuality or fornication, 
constitutes none of these, and therefore need not be prevented in such 
strong terms. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has sought to demonstrate that there are three 
normative principles upon which orthodox jurists within Shi’i Islam 
seek to regulate sex. The first of these is that human beings, and men 
in particular, are driven by an intense and well-nigh debilitating need 
to engage in a great deal of sex. Secondly, the need must be 
satisfied—given its intensity it would be foolish to attempt any other 
course—but in a manner that does not allow it to become something 
of a secular distraction for a believer whose world should be centered 
around the worship of God. Finally, sex must be organized in a 
fashion that preserves a particular gender-driven differentiation and 
hierarchy as established in the licit sex forms set forth within the 
Book of Nikah. These commitments, the Article demonstrates, 
explain precisely why the rules of Shi’i Islam as concerns sex are both 
simultaneously so permissive, by granting to men the dispensation to 
have sex with a wide variety of different women, and so restrictive, in 
both the recommended and disfavored forms of sex, and also in 
limiting contact with women to whom a man is not related or married. 
It also explains why there are serious punishments imposed on those 
who seek sex beyond the confines of the nikah, and in particular on 
homosexuals, who not only challenge the norms of marital, God-
centered sex, but do so in a fashion that challenges the gender 
differentiation and hierarchy so elaborately constructed. By contrast, 
transsexuals pose no similar threat, and hence some leading Shi’i 
jurists are on balance relatively tolerant of gender change, so long as 
it is accompanied by a simultaneous sex change. The Article also 
shows how these norms overlap with and yet are distinct from liberal 
principles of sex regulation, using the example of sex with minors as 
a fundamental point of differentiation. 
While beyond the scope of this paper, some concluding words 
are in order respecting the manner in which sex regulation actually 
takes place in contemporary Shi’i social fields. This is because in 
important ways, the normative system contemplated by Shi’i Islam is 
not reflected in the manner in which many Shi’a actually live their 
lives. As one who has spent a great deal of time in the Shi’i-
dominated state of post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, I have come to know a 
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large number of Shi’i Iraqis whose formal commitment to the Shi’i 
clerical authorities is quite strong. Indeed, as I have written 
elsewhere, their insistence on specifically mentioning those clerical 
academies in the Iraqi Constitution as it was being negotiated resulted 
in a great deal of tension with competing communities with different 
commitments.337 Yet not one of these Iraqis would regard the idea of 
marrying his daughter at the age of four to a man who wished to 
grope her as anything short of horrific. Their attitudes toward the 
marriage of their own daughters were certainly conservative, but more 
represented by what one might expect among conservative elites in 
the United States in the middle of the twentieth century rather than 
anything reflected in the juristic texts. They expected their daughters 
to go to college, and then marry immediately afterwards, with 
absolutely no sexual experience prior of any kind to that marriage.  
Moreover, not one of these same Iraqis would contemplate, or 
indeed tolerate, the widespread use of temporary marriage within their 
own social spaces.338 This might explain why a draft Personal Status 
Code specifically designed to realize traditional Shi’i rules in Iraq for 
its Shi’i population, approved by Iraq’s government but never enacted 
by its legislature, omitted references to the temporary marriage nearly 
entirely.339 At the same time, at least one circulated draft for a Shi’i 
Personal Status Code for Bahrain’s Shi’a, prepared by a prominent 
cleric, does include reference to temporary marriage in a rather 
unapologetic fashion.340 Moreover, the institution seems to find more 
widespread use in Iran.341 We have also seen how Iran both represses 
homosexuals in severe fashion while at the same time developing into 
something of a “sex change capital,” very much in keeping with Shi’i 
theory on sex regulation.342  
The point of these few words is only to demonstrate that the 
relationship between Shi’i social practice and the normative 
framework contemplated by Shi’i jurists is complex. It cannot be said 
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that juristic rules control social practice entirely. Contemporary Shi’a 
are subject to no small number of influences beyond their own jurists, 
whether those be broader Islamic expectations, human rights 
discourse, economic imperatives, or anything else. All of these surely 
play a role in shaping Shi’i practice.  
Yet it would also be a mistake to dismiss the juristic rules as 
irrelevant. It is hard to believe that in the absence of Khomeini’s 
determinations respecting transsexualism that Iran would have 
embraced the possibility of sex change. It is equally hard to believe 
that the severe persecution of homosexuals in conservative Islamic 
societies generally, and conservative Shi’i ones in particular,343 have 
no origins in traditional understandings of Islamic doctrine.  
More than this cannot be said here. The matter deserves greater 
elucidation in a separate work devoted to the task. I shall endeavor to 
undertake the effort, in a different time and place.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
343. See Emine Saner, Gay Rights Around the World: The Best and Worst Countries for 
Equality, The Guardian (U.K.), July 30, 2013 (describing Middle East generally, and Iran in 
particular, as being hostile to homosexuality).  
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